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“RUBBER WILL NOT KEEP IN THIS COUNTRY”: FAILED DEVELOPMENT
IN BENIN, 1897-1921
JAMES FENSKE†
Abstract. Nigeria’s Benin region was a major rubber producer in 1960. In 1921, however, the
government abandoned the industry as a failure. I explain why rubber did not take hold before
1921. British conquest was motivated in part by the region’s wild rubber resources. The government
was unable to protect Benin’s rubber forests from over-exploitation. Expatriate firms were reticent
to invest in plantations, and private African plantations remained small. The colonial government
promoted the development of “communal” plantations, but these suffered from labor scarcity, a
weak state, limited information, and global competition.
1. Introduction
In 1961, Nigeria was the Africa’s largest (and the world’s 6th largest) producer of natural rubber
(faostat.fao.org). Rubber production underwent a substantial boom during the Second World
War; Nigerian exports rose from 3,135 tons in 1938 to 10,518 tons in 1945, and continued to
grow afterwards, reaching 57,167 tons on independence in 1960 (Anschel, 1965). The bulk of this
production was centered on mid-Western Nigeria, in areas formerly under the control or influence
of the Benin Kingdom. After the conquest of Benin in 1897, however, the rubber industry was slow
to develop. In 1921, Nigeria exported only 85 tons of rubber, and the colonial government officially
abandoned its support of the industry. Motivated by low producer prices and Britain’s global policy
of reducing rubber acreage, the incoming Director of Agriculture wrote that his department would
cease distributing seeds to “ordinary farmers,” since it was “not desirable that we should appear
to in any way be advocating the planting of this product” (Anschel, 1965, p. 51).
Several recent studies in economics have argued that the geographic endowments are powerful
determinants of economic outcomes. Rubber’s slow development then comes as a surprise. In
particular, suitability for specific crops has been shown to predict what is cultivated, and what in-
stitutions are adopted. Nunn and Qian (2009) show that suitability for potato cultivation predicts
both population and urbanization in the Old World after 1700, and argue that this is evidence
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that this crop provided the calories and vitamins needed to spur these demographic changes. Bubb
(2009) demonstrates that suitability for cocoa cultivation in Ghana is correlated with land alien-
ability, and takes this to imply that cocoa was adopted where it could be planted and that, as
a permanent crop, it drove changes in the country’s land tenure system. Engerman and Sokoloff
(1997) have suggested that regions of the Americas that were suitable for sugarcane adopted slav-
ery, and became unequal societies that failed to develop public education on the same scale as those
that cultivated wheat.
Brazilian Para rubber thrives best with 1900-2000 mm of rainfall per year, temperatures between
24 ◦C and 32 ◦C, deep fertile soil, and altitudes below 300 m (Okpeke, 1992). Mid-Western Nigeria
fits these conditions closely. In present-day Edo state, rainfall averages 1,500-2,500 mm annually,
and the typical diurnal temperature range is from 22 ◦C to 36 ◦C. Benin City is at an altitude of
79 meters. The Acting Colonial Secretary reported in 1907 that “there are large tracts of country
admirably suited for growing rubber.”1 As opposed to the rapid expansion of cocoa cultivation in
Ghana and southwestern Nigeria, however, rubber was slow to take off in this favorable climate.
Similarly, a major theme in African history is the capacity of African cultivators to rapidly adopt
new crops and technologies – their agency. Berry (1975) and Austin (2005) have outlined the brisk
spread of cocoa in southwestern Nigeria and Ghana, respectively. Conversely, writers such as Brett
(1973) and Mackenzie (1998) have stressed that in East Africa, African cultivation of cash crops
had to be actively suppressed where it competed with the interests of white settlers. This is not
a colonial phenomenon; Africans responded to the Columbian exchange by cultivating new crops,
such as maize (McCann, 2005) and cassava (Jones, 1959). In contemporary Africa, writers such
as Amanor (1994) have shown that Africans readily apply their specific ecological knowledge to
changing economic circumstances and opportunities.
If these themes of suitability and agency are general, the delay of Nigerian rubber is a paradox.
Prices alone cannot explain this; while these were roughly 17% higher during the post-war rubber
boom (1946-1960) than from 1900 to 1921,2 annual physical output was more than 35 times greater
during the later period.3 Further, production steadily rose from 1932 to 1939, when prices averaged
a meagre £37 per ton. This was also not due to a failure of government interest in the early period
and encouragement later on. During the Second World War, colonial officials worried that excessive
rubber planting would leave producers poor, since prices would surely crash once peace came. In
1943, the District Officer for Benin Division sent a missive to all the Native Councils to tap “all
the rubber you can now, and save some of the money to make palm plantations after the war.”4
Before 1921 the government had encouraged collection of wild rubber, private African plantations,
communal African plantations, and European plantations. So, what went wrong?
In this paper, I focus on institutions, information, and inequality as explanations for the prob-
lems faced by Benin’s rubber industry. Several recent studies in economics have shown that both
1Southern Nigeria Annual Report for 1907.
2Anschel (1965) gives price figures that average £153 per ton from 1900 to 1921, and £179 per ton from 1945 to 1960.
325,884 tons versus 701, on average (ibid.).
4National Archives, Ibadan (NAI): BP 1470 Vol 2: Permanent Crops in the Benin Division. 16 Oct, 1943: Distict
Officer to All Councils Benin Division.
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imperfect information and poor institutions impede the adoption of new technologies. In particu-
lar, learning about a new crop takes time, and this slows its spread (Foster and Rosenzweig, 2010).
Conley and Udry (2010) demonstrate that pineapple farmers in Ghana learn about proper fertilizer
use by observing their neighbors’ choices and outcomes. Bandiera and Rasul (2006), similarly, find
that social networks are important for learning about sunflower in Mozambique. Critically, Besley
and Case (1994) and Foster and Rosenzweig (2001) stress that this learning is non-cooperative; in-
dividuals can free-ride on the costly experimentation of their neighbors, and will adopt a “wait and
see” approach that, while individually rational, is socially sub-optimal. As for poor institutions,
there exists a substantial literature demonstrating that secure property rights in land encourage
agricultural investment; in West Africa this is particularly true for the adoption of tree crops
(Besley, 1995).
In the African history literature, it has similarly been established that planners’ access to infor-
mation matters for the success of projects and industries. Many colonial projects failed because
they were based on misinformed prejudices of European officials. Beusekom (2002) describes how
French planners in charge of the Office du Niger were confronted with the reality that intensive
plough agriculture could not be easily introduced to effect agrarian and social change in Mali.
Fairhead and Leach (1996), similarly, show that forest preservation in Guinea was based on the
incorrect premise that local people were, though their farming practices, destroying the region’s
forest cover. In the area under study here, von Hellermann (2007) has highlighted colonial foresters’
“profound unease at the seeming chaos of shifting cultivation” as a motivation for the introduction
of Taungya planting as a system of forest conservation. Planners’ lack of local knowledge similarly
contributed to the failures of the East African Groundnuts Scheme (Bromund, 1997), terracing
programs in East Africa (Maack, 1996; Mackenzie, 1998), and the Thaba-Tseka Project in Lesotho
(Ferguson, 1990).
Scholarship on Africa has also highlighted the importance of inequality in the success or failure
of projects and industries. In fact, African participation in many “successful” industries had to be
compelled, because only certain groups benefitted from them. In much of the continent, poll taxes
were necessary to create a supply of migrant laborers (Arrighi, 1970). In colonial Mozambique,
peasants who refused to produce their quota of cotton were forced to work in labor gangs, on
plantations, or were deported to Sa˜o Tome (Isaacman, 1996). In the early years of coal mining under
colonial rule at Enugu, many of the workers were slaves whose masters were able to appropriate a
share of their wages (Brown, 2003).
These themes help explain why rubber failed to take off in mid-Western Nigeria before 1921. In
this paper, I use primary and secondary sources to outline the problems facing rubber in Benin
during this period. I argue that wild rubber failed because, after undermining the indigenous
state, the colonial government could not create property rights institutions to adequately manage
exploitation of Benin’s wild rubber resources. What could have been a regulated common property
resource degenerated into open access, and the region’s endowment of Funtumia elastica was over-
exploited. I further argue that private plantations of Funtumia and Para rubber, whether owned by
Europeans or Africans, failed to take off because potential planters lacked the information needed to
give them confidence in their future profits. In addition, officials were wary of promoting European
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cultivation of products they believed were within the capacity of West Africans to produce. Finally,
I argue that British encouragement of “communal” plantations suffered due to labor scarcity, limited
state resources, difficulties in transmitting skills and information, and low returns. Further, the
benefits of these plantations did not accrue those whose labor was necessary for their success.
I proceed as follows. In Section 2, I provide background on the world rubber trade to 1921, on
Benin, and on the primary and secondary sources used for this study. In Section 3, I show how
Benin’s untapped forests of wild rubber helped motivate British conquest, I describe the regulations
created by the the colonial state to protect these, and I outline the reasons why the British failed to
successfully police their exploitation. In Section 4, I discuss the failures of plantation rubber, and
deal with European, African, and communal plantations in turn. I show that Europeans largely
refrained from production. I argue that African plantations were few in number. I provide evidence
of the challenges faced by the communal plantations. I then use a simulation exercise to show that
the communal plantations were a risky undertaking from the start. In Section 5, I conclude.
2. Background and sources
2.1. Rubber in Africa, 1890-1921. In 1735, the French explorer Charles Marie de La Condamine
joined a French expedition sent to South America, and became the first European to encounter
natural rubber. Initially the substance was treated as a curiosity, with only limited commercial
applications, such as the production of waterproof fabrics. On November 21, 1843, Thomas Hancock
patented the vulcanization of rubber in the UK. Eight weeks later, Charles Goodyear patented the
same process in the US. Adding sulphur to rubber removed its stickiness, allowed it to regain its
shape when deformed, and improved its durability in cold temperatures. Rubber then became
useful for hoses, tubing, springs, washers, diaphragms, and other industrial uses, spurring demand
(Harms, 1975). This was accelerated by John Dunlop’s patenting of a pneumatic tyre for bicycles
in 18885 and the later diffusion of the automobile. UK rubber consumption rose from 608 tons in
1851 to 10,983 in 1900 (Woodruff, 1955); by 1921, the country’s imports had risen to 42,100 tons
(Rae, 1938).
Global supply came initially from South America. From 1860 to 1910, the Amazon basin ac-
counted for some 60% of world rubber output (Barham and Coomes, 1994, p. 80). Amazonian
production came mostly from wild rubber collected by tappers outfitted by river traders or patro˜s
who acquired land by “purchase, squatters’ rights, or force” and hired matteiros to carve paths
through the forest that connected the rubber trees (Resor, 1977). The patro˜s in turn received
credit from export houses. This organization built on relationships that had already existed during
the Portuguese colonial period (Weinstein, 1983, p. 16). Contemporary writers worried, then, that
the supply of rubber was inelastic (Coomes and Barham, 1994). Critics of this system pointed
to the systematic indebtedness of the illiterate tappers to the patro˜s, who paid them largely in
trade goods. A Parliamentary commission found that one firm operating in Peru had resorted to
mutilation, torture, and murder to coerce the local population into rubber production (Weinstein,
1983, p. 26). Bolivian rubber production took off after Heath’s exploration of the Beni river in
5His patent was later declared invalid, since Robert Thompson had patented the same invention in 1846.
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1880; by 1890 the country’s rubber production was so concentrated in the house of Sua´rez that
contemporaries referred to his organization as an ‘empire’ (Fifer, 1970).
High quality Amazonian Para´ received a premium up to 50% above the price obtained by rubber
from Central America and Africa (Coomes and Barham, 1994, p. 241). In 1872, Henry Wickham
succeeded in smuggling 70,000 rubber seeds out of Brazil with the help of the British consul; these
went via Kew to Ceylon, and on to the rest of Southeast Asia. Asian rubber was first exported
from Ceylon in 1898, where it had been planted on land cleared for coffee before blight struck that
crop (Resor, 1977). Beginning in 1910, rubber exports began to take off in Asia. This new supply
depressed world prices. In Brazil, traders and export houses were driven to bankruptcy, real estate
markets collapsed, and incomes fell back to their pre-boom levels. In 1910, Southeast Asia exported
9,544 tons of rubber; in 1921, this figure was 238,040 tons (Voon, 1976).
During the boom period, many African states also exported wild rubber. From 1890 to 1905,
the Gold Coast was the largest rubber producer in the British empire (Dumett, 1971). In the early
1880s, African merchants such as Francis Chapman Grant and John Sarbah instructed their agents
to buy rubber from the inhabitants of the forests north of Cape Coast, which they collected from
the local Funtumia trees and Landolphia vines. Middlemen brought the rubber trade further into
the interior than had been done with palm produce. Migrants came south from Gurunshi and
Gyaman to serve as porters. In Upper Guine´e, the rubber trade went through two historical phases
(Osborn, 2004). From 1880 to 1901, local collectors and Muslim traders exported their product
through British-controlled Freetown, while after 1901 European merchants entered and redirected
the trade to Conakry. African producers and commercial traders remained important throughout,
thwarting colonial control; in particular, the state was unable to overcome problems of adulteration.
Twenty-six companies were floated in Britain to invest in (mostly wild) rubber production in
West Africa between 1905 and 1914, but Munro (1981) argues that they had no lasting impact.
The colonial office was hostile towards creating monopolies for the collection of wild rubber, while
expatriate firms suffered from an “inadequate financial and managerial structure,” with fraudulent
or near-fraudulent concerns emerging as a result. In East Africa, 22 companies were floated (Munro,
1983). These, by contrast, invested largely in planted Ceara rubber in Kenya and Tanganyika, and
Para in Uganda. These suffered from high labor costs and low yields, and it was clear that investors
did not fully anticipate the negative effects of Asian production on world prices. By 1914, the rubber
boom in East Africa was largely over.
The most infamous example of African rubber production during these years was the “red rubber”
period in the Congo Free State. Hochschild (1998) has outlined many of the worst abuses, including
hostage taking to ensure rubber quotas were met and cutting off of hands by company agents to
account for cartridges used. By his own estimates, murder, starvation, exhaustion, exposure,
disease, and a plummeting birth rate during this period left the Congo with a population half
of what it would have been otherwise. While Hochschild (1998) suggests that the end of red
rubber was due to the humanitarian campaign of figures such as E.D. Morel, Roger Casement and
William Sheppard, Harms (1975) looks more specifically at the internal correspondence of Abir,
a concessionary company. He argues that the reform campaigns were far less important than the
physical reality that, by 1905, the rubber supplies were largely exhausted.
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Within Nigeria, the mid-West was not the only region that participated in the boom. During the
1880s, the governor of Lagos promoted rubber as part of his strategy of diversifying the colony’s
exports (Omosini, 1979). Governor Carter brought Fanti tappers into Ibadan to teach the locals
their trade, but they kept their skills to themselves and were expelled at the behest of the Ibadan
authorities in 1895. The colonial government granted a monopoly over the rubber trade in Ibadan
to F. & A. Swanzy in 1895, but due to local protests at the firm’s dishonest practices, this was
revoked the same year. Production declined from 1896 onwards. British officials such as Denton
and Punch blamed overtapping and cutting down of trees, some 75% of which had died by 1899.
Omosini (1979) pins the pervasiveness of slaughter-tapping in part on the example left behind by
the Fantis and the failure of the colonial office to instruct Yoruba tappers about the dangers of
improper tapping.
2.2. The Benin Kingdom region of Nigeria. In this paper, I focus on rubber production on
the area once under control of the Kingdom of Benin. This coincides roughly with the Benin
District depicted in Figure 1. The Edo language of the region’s inhabitants diverged from Igbo
and Yoruba some 3,000 to 6,000 years ago (Ryder, 1969). The dynasty of Obas (kings) that ruled
Benin until the British conquest in 1897 traces its origins to Eweka I, the son of a Yoruba prince,
who rose to power c. 1200 (Egharevba, 1936). Under Ewuare, c. 1440, Benin became known as a
military power, subjugating towns in Ekiti, Ikare, Afenmai, and among the western Igbo. It was
during his reign that the first European visited the area in 1472 (ibid). Benin sold slaves, stone
beads and pepper to the Portuguese from c. 1480. Pepper, cotton cloths and ivory figured in Bini
trade with the English from c. 1550 and the Dutch from roughly 1600 (Ryder, 1969). Slaves were
important in Benin’s 18th century trade, but the state became isolated from the coast during the
the palm oil trade of the nineteenth century. In 1897, following the massacre of an expeditionary
party led by Consul-General Phillips, the British sacked Benin City. Benin was part of the Niger
Coast Protectorate until 1900, Southern Nigeria until 1914, and Nigeria thereafter.
Rubber production in Benin is worthy of study. Mid-Western Nigeria was one of the world’s major
rubber producers after the Second World War, and in 1961 rubber was Nigeria’s 6th largest export
by value (faostat.fao.org). Several works in African history have used the lens of one commodity to
study economic and social change, including cotton in Mozambique (Isaacman, 1996), tobacco in
Zimbabwe (Rubert, 1998), or cotton in Coˆte d’Ivoire (Bassett, 2001). In addition, the problems in
Nigerian rubber to 1921 were mirrored in the difficulties faced by other African and South American
producers. In spite of the centrality of rubber to Benin’s economy, the industry has received little
academic notice. Anschel (1965) and Blanckenburg (1965), in a dissertation and in a short report
respectively, describe the industry as it was in 1965. Egboh (1985) briefly outlines the history of
rubber in Nigeria as a whole, within a larger work on Nigerian forestry. Afigbo (1970) describes
the regulations on rubber tapping as part of Ralph Moor’s policies for the development of Southern
Nigeria. Igbafe (1979) gives a few pages to the early industry in his discussion of Benin’s colonial
history, but he relies heavily on colonial annual reports that paint an excessively rosy picture of
both the success of tapping regulations and the health of the communal plantations. The best
RUBBER IN BENIN, 1897-1921 7
Figure 1. Southern Nigeria
Source: Southern Nigeria Annual Report for 1907.
treatment of the communal plantations that exists in the literature comes from Usuanlele (nd),
who gives a few pages to these.
Given these existing studies, what do I do that is novel? First, I provide evidence that the
regulations described by Afigbo (1970) and Igbafe (1979) were inadequate, and explain their failures
by invoking the limited resources of the colonial state and the difficulties facing external regulation
of common property resources theorized by Ostrom (1991). I use records of prosecutions under these
regulations to provide new information on tappers and on how the rules were enforced. Second, I
use evidence from colonial reports and the West African Lands Committee (WALC) to show the
limited nature of European plantations (apart from Miller Brothers’) and to outline the difficulties
they faced in acquiring labor. Third, I compare the size of the African-owned plantations to the
communal plantations to show that these were limited in extent, and similarly use evidence from
the WALC to argue that these also had trouble finding labor. Finally, I look in greater detail at
the problems of the communal plantations than Usuanlele (nd), highlighting challenges other than
labor scarcity. I use a numerical simulation to assess just how risky these were as a project.
2.3. Sources. I explain the failures of the Nigerian rubber industry to 1921 using both secondary
and primary sources. The main existing studies on rubber in Benin are Anschel (1965) and Blanck-
enburg (1965). On colonial Benin, Egharevba (1936), Igbafe (1979), von Hellermann and Usuanlele
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(2009), and Usuanlele (nd) are invaluable. For primary sources, I have relied on colonial annual
reports, and on archival correspondence taken from the National Archives of the United Kingdom
(NAUK) in Kew and the National Archives of Nigeria in Ibadan (NAI).
3. Wild rubber
In 1838, two surgeons from the schooner “Warree” visited Benin City with a view to opening
trade through Gwato (Ughoton). At one of the market squares, “they were shocked by the sight
of what may be termed a ‘Golgotha,’ a place where human skulls were heaped up and bleaching in
the sun” (Becroft, 1841). Visiting in 1862, Burton (1863, p. 286) wrote that “nothing can be said
in favour of Benin; the place has a fume of blood, it stinks of death.” While Europeans stressed
humanitarian motives and removing the tyranny of the Oba as motives for conquest in 1897, Igbafe
(1970) has shown that economic motives played a far more important role in the fall of Benin.
Little can be added to his argument here, except to note that the untapped rubber resources
of Benin were among the major produce that caught the eye of traders and officials prior to 1897.
In an 1892 report, Claude MacDonald, Commissioner of the Niger Coast Protectorate, wrote to
the Foreign Secretary that “[t]here is plenty of rubber in the country, but the natives have a great
disinclination to start working a new commodity. They are very conservative in their ideas, and
prefer to follow in the footsteps of their forefathers rather than striking out in a line of their own.”6
One trader in 1896 reported to the Liverpool chamber of commerce that the Oba would not allow
own people to crack kernels, sell gum, or collect rubber, and turned back British traders who
endeavored to open up the trade (Ofonagoro, 1979, p. 149). Similarly, Miller’s agent at Ughoton
informed Acting consul Phillips in 1896 that, while there was “plenty” of rubber produced in the
country, he was unable to get a “rubber man” from Cape Coast to collect it in any quantity, since
he would not go far from Ughoton, having been twice “maltreated while away in the bush” (Ryder,
1969, p. 277). In the same letter, he hinted to Phillips that if “Benin was under proper Government
and the resources of the country properly developed, [he was] firmly of the opinion that the exports
would be very great.”7
In 1896, a man from Lagos went to see the King of Benin on the advice of Ralph Moor, the
new Commissioner, “chiefly with a view to asking the King to start the ‘rubber’ industry, the
country abounding in that product.” Phillips reported that the man “made presents to the King
to the value of over £30, but the results of his mission have been nil.” Later in the same letter,
he warned the Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies that his instructions “to deal with this
matter by pacific means have been literally obeyed and have failed to produce the results desired.”8
In November 1897, soon after the fall of Benin, Moor reported the 25% increase in rubber exports
to be “satisfactory,” adding “and I anticipate considerable increase in the future as much trouble
has been taken to open up rubber production...A rich country has been opened up to the influence
of civilization and trade, containing extensive rubber forests, valuable gums, the usual products of
palm oil and kernels, and possibly many other valuable economic products.”9
6NAUK, FO 2/51. Enc. in Jan 12, 1893: Macdonald to Rosebery.
7NAUK, FO 2/102: 24 Nov, 1896: Phillips to Under-Secretary of State; Enc: 9 Nov, 1896: Brownridge to Phillips.
8NAUK, FO 2/102. 16 Nov, 1896: Phillips to Under-Secretary of State.
9Niger Coast Protectorate, Annual Report for 1896-7.
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Benin had been opened for trade in general, and rubber exports in particular. In this section, I
outline the early trade in wild rubber, collected largely from the local Funtumia trees. I argue that
the new government was unable to police over-exploitation of Benin’s rubber resources. First, the
government lacked the resources to adequately police rubber tapping. Second, they undermined
the existing systems of property rights, and were unable to replace them with foreign regulation.
The immediate aftermath of the fall of Benin was one of drastic change, described by Igbafe
(1975). Much of the city had been burned down and many of the inhabitants had fled. In order
to encourage resettlement, Turner, the new Resident, declared that any slave who returned to the
city before his master would be free. Thus, moves against slavery were more rapid in Benin than
in much of colonial Africa (c.f. Roberts and Miers (1988)). This pattern was reinforced by the
Slave Dealing Proclamation (1901), Slave Dealing Ordinance (1908), and Slavery Proclamation
(1916), though it was partly counteracted by the Native House Rule Ordinance and use of forced
labor by the colonial government in porterage and road maintenance. Further, British officials
were quite willing to uphold the rights of slave owners. In an 1899, case10 Fosbery (Turner’s
successor) sentenced a disobedient slave of the King of Ewu (in Esan territory) to six months
imprisonment and forfeiture of his property to the King of Ewu, when the Obaseki testified that he
had been disobedient. According to Bradbury (1973), Benin was under more or less direct rule until
1914. Though a Native Council was established in 1897, it did not have many functions; instead
Administrative Officers relied largely on the Obaseki and a handful of chiefs for advice. With the
unification of Northern and Southern Nigeria in 1914, indirect rule was introduced; Eweka II was
made Oba, while Obaseki became the Iyase.
After the the capture of Benin in February 1897, Yoruba and Fante tapping gangs moved in
to tap rubber almost immediately. This was part of a larger move of Hausas and Yorubas into
the Anambara valley and Cross River territories, backed by the armed forces of the Royal Niger
Company (RNC) and over local opposition (Ofonagoro, 1979, p. 89, 122). On February 24, Moor
reported that six “Accra men, captured in the Mahin country rubber collecting during the last few
months, came in from the bush heavily ironed,” meaning that some of these incursions had begun
even before the city’s fall.11 The British believed these outsiders were aiding the fugitive chiefs
Ologbosheri and Abohun. Fosbery reported that “it would be most difficult to place a limit as to
those assisting, for undoubtedly all the rubber cutters in that part of the country were in his favour,
and on the day of the first engagement our men were cursed from the bush by Yorubas.”12 Later
on, he met a man called Deji, living at Isua. “This man’s residence,” he noted, “was undoubtedly
the head centre of all the Yoruba rubber cutters in that part of the district; both these men were
arrested, with several of their followers” (ibid). He expressed concern that the Yorubas had killed
many of the local Funtumia, but also described his hope that the recently enacted rubber regulations
(described below) would improve the situation:
The bush passed through between Iho and Isure, Isua and Ihuekpe has been a very
rich rubber country, but I regret to say is now full of dead rubber trees. ... Close
10NAI, Ben. Prof. 8/2/1, Case Book 1898-1899: Regina v. Ugiemi.
11NAUK, FO 881/7002: Feb 24, 1897: Moor to Salisbury.
12Benin Territories Expedition Correspondence 1899: Enc 4: Report on Expedition against Ologbosheri and Abohun
by Fosbery.
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to Deji’s house at Isua there were steps down an incline made of a dead rubber
tree. The natives stated they never worked rubber, that it was done entirely by the
Yorubas. I expounded the rubber regulations [described below] on every available
opportunity, and urged the people to protect the riches of their country. ... This
rubber has of course been a great source of revenue to Ologbosheri, and I am certain
a good deal of it found its way to Benin City (ibid).
Most of the wild rubber collected came from Funtumia, though Landolphia vines, Clitandra, and
various root rubbers were also exported. Collectors would “grub the plant up root and step then
pound these to pieces for the purpose of separating the latex from the crushed tissues, which [was]
usually done by means of boiling water.”13
Early on, British firms applied for concessions to work Benin’s rubber. In May 1898, Gallwey
reported that he had received a telegram from Bleasby, asking for a concession of fifty square miles
to work both rubber and timber. Moor, who was on leave, replied that he was “opposed to the
granting of such Concessions as they savoured somewhat of monopoly also they milk the country
too heavily without supplying commensurate feeding.” He was, in fact, “inclined to object to the
applicants rather more than the concessions for they put little or nothing into the country and
want the concessions merely to draw all they can out.” He believed that that there were few
concessionaires “who want really to do anything for Africa but many who want poor Africa to
do much for them.”14 Gallwey agreed, stating that he did not yet consider the time “ripe” for
concessions. In his view, applicants typically had “no intention of investing capital in the country.
What they would probably do would be to work their concessions with great energy so as to get as
much out of it in the shortest possible time,” leaving the local peoples worse off. He favored instead
“development by the natives themselves,” a view that would later be integral to the “West African
policy” described by Phillips (1989). Finally, he noted that Chamberlain had recently pointed
out to the House of Commons that it was difficult to assess whether chiefs had the authority to
make concessions for their own benefit, and that concessions were therefore often brought to the
local government for approval that “eventually prove to be signed by men who had no title to the
land.”15
The Royal Niger Company took advantage of the removal of the Oba to expand into Benin
territory. RNC agents moved into subject towns, encouraging them to ignore the British officers in
Benin City, in order to divert trade. Moor reported that, during the expedition against Ologbosheri,
arms and ammunition had “found their way into the disaffected area from the territories of the
Royal Niger Company, and were no doubt exchanged for the rubber, to obtain which valuable rubber
forests have been most seriously damaged by the tapping of trees by reckless and inexperienced
workers.”16 It was his belief that there had been a “a general league between the rebels, the local
inhabitants, and the Yorubas who were in the territories as traders in rubber” (ibid). While some
of the rubber trade had managed to find its way into Benin City, the majority he believed had been
13Report on the Forest Administration of Southern Nigeria for 1906.
14NAUK, FO 2/179: 13 May, 1898: Gallwey to Under-Secretary of State.
15NAUK, FO 2/179: 28 July, 1898: Gallwey to Under-Secretary of State.
16Benin Territories Expedition Correspondence 1899: #1: May 27, 1899: Moor to Chamberlain.
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pushed into the territories of the RNC, whose mark had been found on kegs of powder held by
the guerrillas. Rubber continued to bleed into RNC territory after this; the defendants in Regina
v. Akonweli, Odutala, and Ola17 claimed to be employed by a man named Omoli, living in RNC
territory, who had sent them to Ipoki to work rubber. They had been working there five days
without a license when they were arrested. Fosbery sentenced them to three months imprisonment
with hard labor.
Quickly, the British concluded that these tappers were killing the trees. “Makeshift” regulations
were imposed in 1897 “to stop foreigners entering the Benin country for the purpose of working the
economic products therein.”18 These have been outlined by Afigbo (1970). Foreigners, defined as
those not speaking Edo as their mother tongue, were required to obtain licenses from the Resident
every 6 months for a fee of 10s. Further, the regulations prohibited all persons from “tapping
rubber trees in such a manner as to permanently damage them or to interfere with their future
yield.” The “Chiefs of the districts” were made responsible for supervising adherence to this rule,
and were to be awarded half penalties in all cases of conviction. The colonial office was unsure
whether these regulations were legal; one margin note (signed HBL on April 10, 1899) read, “I do
not quite see how these regulations have the force of law. They appear to be Queen’s Regulations
made without the Queen’s consent.” Another note (signed by RW, on May 6) pointed out that it
was unclear if Queen’s Regulations made under the Africa Order in Council 1889 could be enforced
against Lagos persons. These legal niceties did not prevent Fosbery from promoting the regulations
during his operations against Ologbosheri.
According to Igbafe (1979, p. 340-342), rubber inspectors were sent out to explain these regula-
tions. Forestry Inspectors trained local boys in tapping, who were given licenses and would then
pass their knowledge onto others. Local men with influence were appointed to assist the village
chiefs in policing violations. Later, a tax of 20% was imposed on rubber worked by foreigners in
Benin, split evenly between the “owners of the land” and the colonial government. License holders
were required to plant rubber seeds where they worked.
The prosecutions under these regulations19 tell us about the foreign tappers who moved into
Benin, and how the rules were enforced. In Regina v. Gbeson and Aburonke, Regina v. Adeanju,
and Regina v. Lawojo and Omoleye, the defendants were each sentenced to six months or one year
each for “illicit rubber working” or “working rubber without a license.” The defendant in Regina
v. Olowo had been trained by the Government rubber inspector to work rubber; he and four others
had been sent out six months earlier and not seen since. He was arrested along with three others in
Owedou, and three of his other accomplices had escaped. He and his brother had worked together,
the defendant selling his product “for a piece of cloth,” and his brother for 7/6. He was sentenced
to one month of hard labor.
In Regina v. Ipapa, Ehenua, Obasuye, Asaota, and Jegede, the defendants were described as
“a portion of a gang of 150 who were surprised by the Yorubas of the town working rubber near
Okiewo.” They were found with rubber just collected in a calabash and rubber gouges, and were
17NAI, Ben. Prof. 8/2/1, Case Book 1898-1899.
18NAUK, CO 444/1, 5 March, 1899: Moor to Under-Secretary of State.
19All of the cases cited here are from NAI, Ben. Prof. 8/2/1, Case Book 1898-1899.
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sentenced to 1 year hard labor each. The defendant in Regina v. Jagbohun was charged with
not leaving Benin territory, after the court had found him guilty of “complicity with illicit rubber
workers,” and ordered him to vacate the area within three days or face imprisonment. Ten days
later, he was brought down from Isua, pleading that he was in fact trying to catch some illicit
rubber workers. The incredulous Acting Resident (he or Fosbery serve as judge in all these cases)
sentenced him to six months hard labor.
The defendant in Regina v. Thomas Ouami was charged with being the headman of a gang
of illicit rubber workers. The chief prosecution witness, T.A. Moses, a rubber inspector, told the
court that he found the prisoner in the act of working rubber with a large gang of men under him.
On recognizing Moses, Ouami ordered his men to escape at once, begged Moses not to report him
to the Consul, and offered him a bribe. He later sent three men who lived in the same house in
Benin City to “beg” Moses not to report him. The three men, all with Christian names, confirmed
that the defendant had asked them to beg Moses not to inform the consul, but claimed that he had
not told them what crime he had committed. Ouami, in his defense, told the court that Doctor
Howe had advised him to “collect some native medicine” for his hand, which he had been pursuing
when Moses surprised him. Moses replied that he had served as an interpreter between Ouami and
Howe, but that Howe had never given any such advice. Ouami’s undoing was his claim that he
had asked the three men to ask Moses to serve as an interpreter for him in an upcoming debt case,
and had not asked them to beg Moses not to report him; this contradicted their testimony. The
acting resident also considered a prior record against the defendant for obtaining money by false
pretences as evidence of his bad character (for which he had received 6 months hard labor and a
dozen lashes), and sentenced him to 9 months of hard labor.
Adulteration was a worry even in this early stage. Regulations passed over the objections of the
European trading firms in 1897 allowed for confiscation of adulterated rubber, with fines of up to
£50 with six months imprisonment for violation (Igbafe, 1979). In Regina v. Osufu Jebu, Sumola,
and Bakari, the prosecution witness (a Captain) stated that he found Osufu Jebu at Udo, carrying
adulterated rubber towards Lagos – this was produced in court and “found to be adulterated and
very offensive.” The prisoners claimed they had bought the rubber in Benin City and did not
know it was adulterated. They were imprisoned with hard labor for six months, and the rubber
was destroyed. The same Captain told the court in Regina v. Jegidi and Agbi that, while in the
same area, the residents of Obahon informed him that the defendants were cutting rubber. They
claimed to be from Umapa, but “the natives of that village,” told him that they had never seen
the men before. They carried articles of trade with them. Though they claimed to be traders, and
not rubber cutters, they were sentenced to six months imprisonment and hard labor. The Captain
was also the prosecution witness in Regina v. Ground Nut, Jack, and Josiah. The defendants in
that case had been arrested by the headman of Rejain with “a lot of tools etc. used for working
rubber.” The Captain told the court that he had previously instructed the headman to arrest all
those cutting rubber without a license. Their sentence was two years imprisonment with hard labor.
In addition, the court noted that Ground Nut was a Mendi (likely Mende, from Sierra Leone) who
had deserted government service and was charged with raping a small child.
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What do these cases teach us? First, it is clear that enforcement required active policing by
colonial staff such as the forest guards and the captain mentioned above, who apprehended violators.
Second, the work of these officials required the active cooperation of local communities. Third,
tappers often operated in large gangs, even if a few violators could be apprehended, many would
escape into the bush. Together, these suggest that policing rubber tapping was difficult. Finally, the
court was quite eager to use punitive sanctions to prohibit unlawful exploitation of forest products.
Notably, there is only one rubber case in this record book in which the defendant is acquitted.20
Almost immediately, these regulations were seen to be inadequate (Afigbo, 1970). In October of
1898, Gallwey reported that the Benin country was “full of rubber,” but that the Acting Resident,
Benin City, had “continually been complaining” over the past year of the destruction of rubber
trees, which he attributed to “the manner in which the natives tapped them.” The number of trees
killed, he suggested, “amount to no small figure.” He recommended that a rubber inspector and
two workers be sanctioned to prevent those without licenses from tapping the trees.21 In February
1899, Moor similarly stated that he found it “utterly impracticable to preserve the rubber forests
in the Benin City District unless there be a special European officer detailed for the work as the
natives in collecting will cut and damage the trees, and also tap them in the wrong season.” Since
the capture of Benin City, officers had tried to deal with it but due to their “enormous amount of
other work” it was impossible to supervise the Native Inspectors. In his opinion, the matter was a
“pressing” one, and “of great importance for the rubber forests in question are of very considerable
extent and of great value and if properly preserved now and dealt with on proper forestry lines
they will in future be exceedingly valuable.”22
In 1899, the rubber regulations were amended. The maximum imprisonment was extended to
two years, and violators were required to forfeit any illicit produce. In addition, a closed season
was imposed from December to June, and tapping that caused damage to the trees was prohibited
(Afigbo, 1970). Prosecutions made under these regulations are also preserved in the Case Book
for 1898-1899. In Regina v. Akinbo, the defendant, charged with “illicit rubber working,” pleaded
guilty to “working rubber during the close time,” and was sentenced to 6 months of hard labor. The
defendant in Regina v. Aluko was a “foreigner” caught by the above-mentioned Captain working
rubber unlawfully at Udo, and found with a large quantity of rubber in his house covered over with
cinders; he pleaded that he was a trader, but was sentenced to two years imprisonment with hard
labor.
In Regina v. Oje and Ayeyi, Oje pleaded guilty to working rubber during the close season (the
prosecution witness Gbadamosi told the court that both were “constantly employed in this way”).
Ayeyi initially denied the charges before later admitting them. Oje was sentenced to 4 months hard
labor, Ayeyi 5. Regina v. Ejei et al, similarly, saw six men out of a larger group arrested. Ejei,
their leader, had formerly worked under a Fanti headman who had been expelled from the country
by the acting Resident. The defendants claimed to be traders who had ceased working rubber since
the new regulations were made, but were sentenced to two years imprisonment with hard labor.
20Regina v. Osun and Abiomo; no reason is given for why charges are dismissed.
21NAUK, FO 2/185; Oct 26, 1898: Gallwey to Salisbury.
22NAUK, FO 2/185; 17 Feb, 1899: Moor to Under-Secretary of State.
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The court also noted that the headman of Uhen, who apprehended the prisoners, was to receive
the reward laid down by the regulations.
The Forestry Department was created in 1900; according to Gallwey the “first matter that
required dealing with by this department was the preservation of the extensive rubber forests
in the Benin territories.”23 In his annual report, he gave great credit to Hitchens, the Forestry
Inspector, for the “very energetic manner in which he carried out this work, and for the successful
efforts he made to educate the Binis to safeguard the rubber trees. The wholesale destruction of
yielding trees and vines in both the Lagos and Gold Coast Colonies pointed to the necessity there
was for immediately framing regulations laying down the manner in which the rubber should be
worked, and the seasons when it was permitted to work it” (ibid). Moor drew up regulations that
were made law in the Benin territories, and which Gallwey believed were effective.
Hitchens reported that he had personally inspected and assessed the value of the rubber forests
belonging to nearly 100 Bini towns and villages, and created “staffs of ex-officio rubber inspec-
tors” in each of them, proportionate with the size of the forest (ibid). He instructed locals in
tapping, explained the regulations, and “constitute[ed] every Bini an ex-officio policeman to bring
to justice any rubber gatherer infringing on the regulations.” In his view, the Bini “responded
with alacrity,” exercising “such restraining influence on prohibited rubber-tapping and adulterated
rubber-producing that not a single rubber gatherer is free from close ‘shadowing,’ and not a single
ball of rubber and prohibited root rubber could work its undetected way to Lagos or our own
trading factories.” He did not believe it was possible for rubber to leave any portion of the Benin
territories, even in the newly acquired Eastern districts.
Moor’s regulations were initially only in force in the Benin territories; the other rubber forests of
Southern Nigeria were in areas where Native Councils had not yet been established, so that similar
laws could be made there. Gallwey felt, however, that it would “probably be found advisable to issue
a Proclamation dealing with rubber forests throughout the Protectorate.” In 1900, the Forestry
Proclamation was issued; this required licenses be acquired from the District Commissioner to tap
rubber, provided details on the permitted methods of tapping, and were applied to all persons, not
just foreigners (Afigbo, 1970, p. 390). The Government wished to use this proclamation to begin the
forced creation of forest reserves, but due to fierce opposition, this could not be implemented (von
Hellermann and Usuanlele, 2009). These regulations did lead to some conflicts over jurisdiction.
In 1901, Moor, now the High Commissioner of Southern Nigeria, noted that the Resident of Benin
City had seized rubber that had been collected during the closed season, believing that he had the
authority to do so; Moor did not believe that he did, and so issued an additional regulation to
make this possible.24
At first, the restrictions on rubber collection appeared to be working. More than £700 was
collected as license fees from the Benin territories in 1900.25 Probyn, the Acting High Commissioner,
noted noted a fall off in rubber exports in 1902, arguing that timber has attracted “many who
formerly collected rubber, and the legislation which has stopped the destruction of rubber trees is
23Southern Nigeria Annual Report 1899/00.
24NAUK, CO 520/9. 17 Oct, 1901: Acting High Commissioner to Secretary of State.
25Southern Nigeria Annual Report for 1900.
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probably a second cause which accounts for the decline.”26 In 1904, Egerton suggested that the
Forestry Department was then “fully organized and capable of exercising an efficient control over
timber cutting and, in a lesser degree, over the proper tapping of rubber-bearing plants.”27 At the
beginning of that year, H.N. Thompson, the Conservator of Forests, advised ending the December-
May close season, and rubber exports rose. Rule 7 of 1905 amended the rubber regulations, and
the Forestry Department brought in £653 10s revenue from rubber in Southern Nigeria.28 In 1906,
£368 was collected for 645 rubber licenses (Igbafe, 1979).
In the Report on the Forest Administration of Southern Nigeria for 1906, Thompson wrote in
particularly glowing terms about the license system, which he believed had
worked very satisfactorily in the Benin Districts of the Central Province where the
native communities take a lively interest in forestry matters and are fully alive to
the importance of preserving the plants – an annual source of revenue to themselves.
No doubt in time the inhabitants of the other districts in the Protectorate will adopt
the same attitude towards the license system.
He felt that the rubber and timber rules were working “very smoothly” in the Central Province,
where the chiefs had taken “and active interest in protecting their forests, and the inhabitants
are becoming very law-abiding in this respect.” 1114 licenses were issued, resulting in £671 10s
paid, £557 of which went to the Government. 645 of these were given in Benin City. He did,
however, add a word of caution about the “natives”; “as long as they are encouraged by the trade
to ruthlessly destroy the rubber-yielding plants by getting as much as possible out of them in the
shortest possible time and then to leave the rest to chance, I am afraid but little attention will
be paid by them to more prudent advice.” 1541 licenses were given out in the Central Province
in 1910, and 1756 in 1911, and in that year the Government began dividing revenues equally with
“the chiefs and villagers.”29
The regulations were ultimately unsuccessful, however. Trees were still being destroyed in large
numbers. In 1901, the Resident reported that it was “deplorable to see what destruction was
wrought by the foreign element some years ago around Ibewhe. Dead rubber trees can be counted
by the hundred.”30 In 1906, F.S. James, the Colonial Secretary, suggested that the work of rubber
preservation was not completed, but rather in progress:
There has been no systematic cultivation or preparation of the rubber, and the forest
trees have been destroyed through want of knowledge and practically uncontrolled
collection, except that during the last four years when a serious attempt has been
made by the Forestry Department in the Eastern and Central Provinces to arrest
the evil.31
In the hinterland of Lagos, by contrast, the efforts of the Forestry Department were “restricted to
advice” as rubber rules under the Forestry Proclamation were not in force. Though the close season
26Southern Nigeria Annual Report for 1902.
27Southern Nigeria Annual Report for 1904.
28Southern Nigeria Annual Report for 1905.
29Southern Nigeria Annual Reports for 1911 and 1912.
30NAUK, CO 520/7, 26/2/1901: Resident Benin City to Moor.
31Southern Nigeria Annual Report for 1906.
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had been done away with in 1906, it was re-imposed in 1907, and exports fell.32 The Annual Report
for 1908 was yet more gloomy, stating that “[r]ubber appears to be a rapidly decaying business ...
the Southern production in 1908 was 713,000 lbs. only, as compared with 1,656,000 lbs. in 1907.
Some portion of the shortage may be attributed to the prohibition of tapping in certain districts,
but the reckless destruction of trees by excessive bleeding is largely responsible for the drooping
business.” In spite of this, there were only 12 prosecutions and 10 convictions under the rubber
rules. In 1913, the annual report for Benin Province commented on a marked falling off in the
amount of rubber exported, blaming this partly on the drop in price “and also to the fact that the
wild rubber is much scarcer than formerly.”33
Why did the regulations fail? First, it was physically difficult to police violations. The rubber
regulations diverted some of the rubber trade from Benin to Lagos, as the Acting High Commis-
sioner recognized in 1901.34 Similarly, because Northern Nigeria had no similar regulations on
rubber collection, rubber was smuggled from the South to the North (Egboh, 1985, p. 57). In 1901,
the representative of Miller Brothers wrote to Moor, informing him of the difficulties involved. “Few
of those who bring down rubber,” he argued, were “able to give a detailed account of its history
from the time of manufacture, as it may have passed through many hands before reaching theirs.”
Rubber was sold in many markets on its way to the coast, and “many of the rubber traders here
are preparing to leave the district as they profess themselves unable any longer to conduct business
here under the vexatious conditions in force.” He felt that, though under the law every Bini was
made a “rubber detective” and was eligible for a reward of £2 for any conviction, the people had
not looked after their own interests; “they show themselves in that respect unworthy to benefit by
the rubber regulations as they have already proved themselves in other respects, through not yet
devoting the slightest attention to the manufacture of rubber.”35
1905, the Governor recognized that the prohibitions on root rubber were no longer being en-
forced.36 Christy (1911) pointed out that, while 221,566 lbs were exported from Southern Nigeria
in 1907, only £53/10 was collected in license fees.37 It was impossible that 107 license holders could
be responsible for this quantity of rubber, so the bulk must have been illicit. Even if the forestry
staff were to be increased fifty times, he thought it would be impossible to police the area needed:
So long as the native can sell his ‘lump’ rubber at an enormous profit, so long
will he continue his destructive methods of tapping, and his dirty, primitive sys-
tem of preparation, despite voluminous rules and regulations, which he could not
understand, even supposing them ever to reach himself or his chief (Christy, 1911,
p. 13).
Second, the British undermined the systems of property rights that existed before the fall of
Benin, and lacked the public trust necessary to replace them with effective colonial regulation.
32Southern Nigeria Annual Report for 1907.
33NAI, BP 138 1914: Annual Reports Benin Province.
34NAUK, CO 520/9. 17 Oct, 1901: Acting High Commissioner to Secretary of State
35NAUK, CO 520/9, 13 July, 1901: McLucas and Schaumburg (for Miller Bros and Bey & Zimmer) to Moor
36NAUK, CO 520/30, 5 March, 1905: Egerton to Lyttelton.
37Though this contradicts the figure in the Annual Report, the figure in that report is larger, making the argument
stronger.
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Ostrom (1991) has argued that regulation of common property resources by local communities, as
opposed to privatization or state intervention, will be preferable under certain circumstances. There
must be defined boundaries to the resource, and those with rights of use must be identifiable. Rules
must be appropriate to local conditions. Individuals affected by the rules must be able to participate
in modifying them. Monitors must be accountable to users. Sanctions should be graduated by
the seriousness of the offense, and applied by officials accountable to the appropriators. Conflict
resolution must be low cost and rapid. The rights of users to devise their own institutions must be
recognized by wider authorities. In Benin, the de facto boundaries of Benin territory were altered by
British conquest, rules were imposed by an external authority with no local participation, colonial
agents lacked accountability, and the courts in Benin City have been shown above to have been
eager to impose the maximum penalties stipulated under the regulations.
Before 1897, Edo villages could control access to their forest resources. In principle, land in
Benin was “considered as belonging to the people as a whole,” with the Oba as trustee (Egharevba,
1949, p. 77). In each town, village or clan, the Enogie or Odionwere was trustee, under the
Oba’s authority. The village was the effective landowning unit, with no smaller group holding any
recognized permanent interest in land (Bradbury, 1957, p. 45). Any Bini could farm in any part
of Benin territory (Egharevba, 1949, p. 79), though outside of his own village he would need to
obtain permission from (and give annual gifts to) the local Enogie or Odionwere, until he settled
permanently (Bradbury, 1957, p. 45). Hunters in the forests of Benin, “native and non-native” were
required to turn the hand of any animal killed to the Enogie of the local town, and the Oba was
owed a leg and tusk of any elephant killed (Egharevba, 1949, p. 43-44). Critically, the only non-
Edo who, before 1897, could exploit local resources were those who settled and assimilated in Bini
villages (Bradbury, 1957, p. 45). After 1897, outsiders came in seeking rights to farm, fish, and reap
palm fruits, and effective regulations were established only slowly throughout the colonial period
to control these demands. Immediately after 1897, many Yoruba settlers succeeded in gaining
land without holding title through the Oba; these were not regularized until 1914 (Rowling (1948,
p. 11)).
An 1896 editorial in the Lagos Weekly Record put the Oba’s power to police outsiders’ use of
Bini resources in stark terms, wishing that those who damaged trees in the hinterland of Lagos
could be sent to Benin:
Every traveler in the hinterland complains of the devastation wrought by the greedy
rubber hunters. It is complained that the rubber forests are destroyed, the elephants
driven back, and general desolation produced. The King of Benin, it is said, makes
short work of the intruders, and an enraged and disgusted traveler suggests as a
remedy for the injurious results which he saw around him that the greedy rubber
hunters should one and all be dispatched to the domains of the expeditious King of
Benin (quoted by Ofonagoro (1979, p. 120)).
The 1908 trade report for Southern Nigeria reached a similar conclusion; the de facto situation
with regards to property rights was not adequate to protect rubber trees from destruction (though
the writer believed that private property in plantation rubber was the answer):
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The planting of rubber by natives has all along been encouraged and assisted by
the Forestry Department, and in some parts of the Central Province the plantations
are doing very well, and give good promise for the future. It is generally realized
that not until rubber trees are owned by individuals, who will see that they are duly
protected, can this industry be looked upon as a permanent one in Nigeria. Thou-
sands of trees in the forests, which are practically a ‘no man’s land,’ are destroyed
each year by over-tapping, and although every effort is made by the Forestry De-
partment, with the staff at its command, to regulate the gathering and to prevent
indiscriminate bleeding, the task in so large a country and amidst dense forests is,
it must be admitted, and extremely difficult one.38
The Forest Guards, installed to replace these systems, were either inadequate, corrupt, or both.
In 1899, the defendant in Regina v. Amidu39 was charged with seizing a government rubber
inspector. The inspector came across a “large gang of Lagos rubber cutters,” headed by a man
named Gbadamosi. The prisoner seized the inspector along with his two carriers, tied them up,
and gave the inspector a “severe flogging.” They were then handed to a Lagos Hausa, who took the
inspector and his carriers to Igbo-Bini. The Traveling Commissioner sent them to Lagos. When
he returned, the inspector saw the prisoner and arrested him. While the defendant claimed he was
a trader who had never seen the men before, Fosbery sentenced him to six months imprisonment
with hard labor.
The Resident of Benin City complained in 1901 that the “ignorance of some of the native rubber
Inspectors may also have had something to do with the failure of last year’s sowing... Three of
these men have lately brought into Benin City seed in a green and half grown condition, absolutely
useless and of course wasted. One would-be Rubber Inspector, was a small boy about 14 who
would be of about much use as a process server in Ireland of the same age.”40 In 1907, Egerton
noted their frequent abuses of power (unfortunately, not mentioning what these were), stating
that “there are the strongest objections to the multiplication of native Forest guards with semi
police powers carrying on their work in places far away from European supervision.”41 Though
it is outside the time period of this study, the accusation made against one guard in 1940 is an
illustrative example of the corruption available to these officials.42 Oronsaye, a timber contractor,
complained to the District Officer that S.A. Ovbiogbe, a Forest Guard, had aided one Ulitsemitsede
to escape to Benin City when he was accused of illegally farming in the Ohosa Reserve. Oronsaye
further charged that a clerk in the Forest Office was attempting to secure an agreement between
the Ranger, Oronsaye, and the Forest Guard that would allow Ulitsemitsede to escape prosecution.
Because of Thompson’s strong pro-regulation views, Egerton did not press his point.
It was becoming clear that the future of rubber was in plantations. The 1904 Annual Report for
Southern Nigeria stated that experiments were in progress to improve the tapping of trees, “the
present method pursued by natives being most injurious and in fact responsible for the death of
38Quoted in Southern Nigeria Annual Report for 1908.
39NAI, Ben. Prof. 8/2/1, Case Book 1898-1899.
40NAUK, CO 520/7, 26/2/1901: Resident Benin City to Moor
41NAUK, CO 520/45: Minute Dated 12 April, 1907 by Egerton.
42NAI, Ben Dist 6 BD 142 Usen Native Court and District Affairs; 2 Feb, 1940: Oronsaye to District Officer.
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numbers of trees.” Notably, there was “little doubt that the future supply of rubber largely depends
on the cultivation carried on during the year by the natives in the Western and Central Divisions,
214 plantations having been laid down containing a total of 227,155 young trees.” Similarly, Egerton
wrote in 1907 year that, after three years in West Africa, he did not “consider it feasible to efficiently
supervise the collection of latex from rubber bearing plants in the West African forests.”43 Rather,
he felt that the colonial office should “recognize that the future of rubber is in the cultivated article
and that all that is necessary as regards the forest produce is to spread the knowledge of the best
methods of extracting the latex and the folly of improper tapping.”
The failures of wild rubber production in Benin are of broader relevance. Exhaustion of natural
rubber supplies was repeated throughout Africa, in Guine´e (Osborn, 2004), in Ghana (Dumett,
1971), and in the Congo (Harms, 1975). In none of these scenarios could colonial officials or
concessionary companies establish institutions that created effective incentives to extract rubber
at a sustainable rate, or restrict tapping to methods that did not injure the trees. Resor (1977)
suggests several weaknesses of the Brazilian wild rubber industry, including high levies, the loss of
prime territory to Bolivia, poor port and transport infrastructure that was expensive to build and
maintain, and overall high costs of collection. Clearly high transportation costs apply to Benin,
where head porterage remained the norm.
4. Plantation rubber
By 1907, it was obvious that wild rubber offered little future for rubber in Benin. The local
Funtumia could be used to create plantations, and Brazilian Hevea had been introduced to the
country in 1895 (Anschel, 1965, p. 49). By 1921, however, plantations had not transformed Nigeria
into the major rubber producer that it would become after the Second World War. In this section,
I outline the difficulties faced by the three types of plantation in Benin. European plantations were
few in number, because of their own challenges, government hostility to creating concessions, and
the general preference of European firms for horizontal over vertical integration. African plantations
are of only limited visibility in the archival record, but these too appear to have been few in number
and faced challenges in securing labor. African communal plantations were established with the
support of the colonial government, but these suffered from labor scarcity, limited state resources,
difficulty in transferring information, and low returns.
4.1. European plantations. The only serious attempt by a European firm to create a rubber
plantation in Benin was that of Miller Brothers. The firm acquired roughly five hundred acres
at Sapele in 1905, and acquired another 560 in 1911 on the condition that it would be planted
by 1916.44 The 1905 Annual Report for Southern Nigeria claimed that they had been “induced
by His Excellency the Governor” to start this Para plantation with 10,000 seeds imported from
the East. In the first year, 6,800 germinated successfully. Fosbery hoped that the other large
firms on the coast [would] follow this lead and go in for Para cultivation on an extensive scale.”45
43NAUK, CO 520/45, Enc. 14 April, 1907: Egerton to Elgin.
44NAI, BP 311/1914: Rubber Plantation on the Ologbo Road, 18 March, 1911: Provincial Commissioner Warri to
Provincial Commissioner Calabar.
45Southern Nigeria Annual Report for 1905.
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In 1906, they imported 30,000 more seeds, more than 16,000 of which had germinated by year’s
end. Thompson felt that they had “gone whole-heartedly into the work.”46 They experimented
with different approaches, clearing 30 acres of all roots and planting seedlings 3 ft apart in one
section, while leaving the roots in and planting seedlings 15 ft apart on another 60 acres. In 1906,
the plantation was said to be “now in very fine condition,” with the plants showing “excellent
growth.”47 In 1908, it was “doing very well” and showing “good growth”; 8,000 plants were 33
months old, and 22,000 plants were 18 months old, with average girths of 9.33 in and 3.69 in,
respectively.48 Cowan, the director, testified to the West African Lands Committee (WALC) in
1913 that the plantation was paying rent to 5 or 6 different local communities. At that time, 800
acres were under cultivation and the bulk of the 400 laborers did not come either from Benin or
from Sapele, but rather from the Opobo, Kwa, and Ibibio territories (WALC, 1916, p. 468-475).
Others were less successful. In 1915, a return of agricultural plantations in Benin province listed
five – J.G.M Cranstoun and Company’s at Sapoba, Messrs. MacIver’s at Sapoba, I.T. Palmer’s
at Sapoba and Abraka, and the Nigerian Mahogany and Trading Company’s at Unutu.49 MacIver
and Palmer (an African) were both said to have rubber in good condition at this time. Egboh
(1985, p. 159) states that Cranstoun had two plantations in 1908, totalling 1,280 acres. MacIver
reported in 1917 that they were doing no business in rubber, though by 1927 their holdings had
expanded to 2021 acres.50 This (and possibly Cranstoun’s as well) was later taken over by the
United Africa Company, becoming the Jamieson Estate Plantation (Usuanlele, nd). A German
firm, possibly Bey and Zimmer, planted ten acres that were handed over to the Native Authority
during the First World War (Usuanlele, nd). The African Association made an attempt in 1906
to start an experimental Para plantation at Warri, but James believed that they “[did] not seem
to have pushed the matter further.”51 In 1908, they were reported to have an “excellent small
Para rubber plantation at Eket.”52 The British Cotton Growing Association started a plantation
in Benin territory in 1909, but in 1917 it was “neglected,” containing only 228 trees.53
One of the difficulties faced by these plantations was difficulty in securing access to labor. Cowan
told the WALC that his company did not use Bini laborers because, even though they were able to
make arrangements with the headmen, the people were unwilling. Laborers would come to work for
at maximum six months. His view was that this was “no doubt” because the authority of the Benin
chiefs had declined – a development that also made it difficult to secure labor for the communal
plantations, described below.
In addition, the British were reticent to grant concessions to Europeans for working produce
that Africans were capable of exploiting on their own, and so their policy for rubber and palm
46Report on the Forest Administration of Southern Nigeria for 1906.
47Southern Nigeria Annual Report for 1906.
48Southern Nigeria Annual Report for 1908.
49NAI, BP 603 1915 Agricultural Plantations Benin Province. Two lists are given in this file; the first omits Cranstoun,
the second MacIver.
50NAI, Ben Prof 2/4 BP 262 1917: Para Rubber, Benin Division, 16 Nov, 1917: Howe (for MacIver and Co) to
Acting District Officer. NAI, CSO 26 09125 Assessment Report on Benin Division.
51Southern Nigeria Annual Report for 1906, Report on the Forest Administration of Southern Nigeria for 1906.
52Southern Nigeria Annual Report for 1908.
53NAI, BP 175/1917, Para Rubber Plantations, 19 June, 1917: D.O. Ubiaja to Resident.
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oil concessions differed from policies towards timber. The African Association and Miller Brothers
were both rejected for concessions in the Benin City area in 1898 (Afigbo, 1970, p. 392). Evans’
application to rent communal plantations was turned down in 1911 (Egboh, 1985, p. 158). This was
general policy throughout West Africa. As Phillips (1989) has described it, the British came to favor
“peasants” over “plantations” because of opposition from local chiefs, lawyers and concessionary
companies to the 1897 Gold Coast Lands Bill, pressure from the so-called “Third Party” of reformers
that included individuals such as Mary Kingsley and E.D. Morel, their persistent inability to
create a market for wage labor, resistance from the Aborigines’ Rights Protection Society, negative
experiences with spurious concessions that were given early on in the Gold Coast, the rise of
“mercantile” manufacturers such as the British Cotton Growing Association and Cadbury who
seemed capable of healthy profits without engaging directly in production, and a general desire to
limit both litigation and migration.
It was a widespread feature of West Africa that expatriate firms remained horizontally, as opposed
to vertically integrated. Usuanlele (nd) has described this as a preference for this as a “commerce”
over “production” in the case of Benin. This was a general response to a situation where, barred
from directly engaging in agriculture and faced with a market in which export crops were produced
by thousands of small, dispersed farmers, the large trading firms chose to operate in many products
and colonies, but to refrain from production (Hopkins, 1976).
4.2. African plantations. Less is knowable about private plantations owned by Africans. Both
the Annual Reports and Igbafe (1979) take an upbeat view of their progress. In 1903, forestry
officers were said to have extended “very considerable” areas of rubber plantations, while “some of
the more intelligent chiefs” had started operations on their own account.54 In 1906, the Provincial
Forest Officer stated that the “feature of the year ... [had] been the number of small private
plantations made by individual natives, although it [was] difficult to say exactly how many [had]
been made.” He believed there was no doubt that “the natives of the Benin Districts of this
Province are, with a few exceptions, now thoroughly alive to the value of looking after their rubber
trees.”55 Igbafe (1979, p. 343-348) notes that 126 villages had been convinced to start plantations
by the end of 1903, there were 369 private plantations by 1906, and that some 3,000 acres were
owned by eleven private individuals or companies by 1925. The largest of these belonged to Palmer,
reported to have 1500 acres at Abraka, employing 900 laborers who were paid the same wages as in
the timber industry (WALC, 1916, p. 468-475). The Obaseki had two Para plantations, of 10,000
and 12,000 trees, 4 to 6 years old in 1919.56 In the late 1920s, it was reported that, in addition to
Palmer’s plantation, MacIver had 2021 acres at Sapoba.57
Before 1921, however, the scale of these plantations must have been small. Chief Ugo had a single
acre at Benin (Egboh, 1985, p. 159). Thompson described those planted in the Benin City District
in 1906 as “small private plantations.”58 In 1909, it was estimated that private individuals owned
54Southern Nigeria Annual Report for 1903.
55Report on the Forest Administration of Southern Nigeria for 1906.
56NAI, Ben Prof 2/6 BP 480 19: Agricultural Department Report.
57NAI, CSO 26 09125 Assessment Report on Benin Division.
58Report on the Forest Administration of Southern Nigeria for 1906.
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166,820 Para trees or seedlings in Southern Nigeria, “and a great development [was] expected in this
direction.”59 It was reported in 1911 that, in addition to government plantations “and numerous
small plantations owned by natives” there were 241,250 Para rubber trees in large plantations
and 164,350 seedlings in nurseries in Southern Nigeria.60 A 1917 return of Para plantations in
Benin forwarded a list of plantations excluding those with less than 20 trees, and “small private
plantations of which there is no record”. It listed 270 para plantations in Benin District, started in
1914 or 1915, with 57 seedlings planted on average. By contrast, (Christy, 1911, p. 14) estimated
that there were 2,250 “communal” plantations in the Benin City area by 1911.
These too faced their own difficulties. Cowan told the WALC that there were six African-owned
plantations of 10,000 to 30,000 trees in the Sapele district. These were of Para rubber. They had
been paying for labor by allowing their workers to plant “catch crops” among the trees, and as a
result, the rubber had suffered. In his view, they had “tried to make the thing pay as they went
along, and they have been pennywise and pound foolish” (WALC, 1916, p 468-475).
4.3. African communal plantations. During this period, the colonial government also sought
to establish thousands of small plantations of mostly Funtumia rubber throughout Benin territory,
which were to be owned by the communities on whose land they were planted. The explicit term
used by the government was “communal.” At first these were lauded as a successful and promising
enterprize, but before the outbreak of the First World War, it was clear that they were in trouble.
They suffered from labor scarcity, a lack of state resources, colonial difficulties in transferring skills
and information, and low prices once Asian plantations began to export in large quantities.
4.3.1. Initial promise. The communal plantations were started early on. In 1899, nurseries were
established in a few district centers, in order that plantations could be made close to the villages
for seed-producing purposes. These in turn would be used to collect seed to sow in the bush at
the beginning of the rainy season.61 Out of 450 miles of road existing in the Benin territories, the
Forestry Inspector planted 250 miles with rubber seed, four deep on each side of the main roads
and bush paths (ibid). In 1900, twenty large nurseries for young rubber were established in the
Benin territories using seed collected in 1899; the object of this was “supplying rubber seedlings for
transplantation into the forest lands between villages.”62 It was presumed that the labor required
for transplanting and caring for the young rubber would be performed “subject to the supervision
of the Forestry Inspectors, by the inhabitants of those villages which [would] ultimately be enriched
by the matured rubber” (ibid). All villages receiving timber royalties were required to establish
nurseries from 1901 (Igbafe, 1979).
Undergirding these efforts was a paternalistic racism, made clear by Bedwell, the Acting Colonial
Secretary, in 1903:
It is not in the nature of the average West African to lay out capital for which there
is no immediate return. He can understand the yam growing at his door; he can
understand the cask of oil to be filled before his “boys” can return with the required
59Southern Nigeria Annual Report for 1909.
60Southern Nigeria Annual Report for 1911.
61Southern Nigeria Annual Report for 1899-1900.
62Southern Nigeria Annual Report for 1900.
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cloth, pipe or frock-coat, but he will not sew for his son to reap; nor will a village
work, of its own initiative, for the benefit of the next generation that is to occupy
it. It is this difficulty that has rendered so great the task of encouraging the rubber
industry.63
In the villages, the government distributed seeds and seedlings and oversaw tapping. These
plantations were mostly of Funtumia, but contained some Para. By 1903, 15,694 plants had been
established in 33 plantations along the major roads; this had reached 126 villages and 145,000
plants by the end of the year (Igbafe, 1979, p.343). There were 1,050 communal plantations in the
Province in 1906, 1629 in 1907, and 2251 in 1908 (Egboh, 1985, p. 159).
Plantations of this sort were encouraged throughout other parts of Southern Nigeria, though
Benin was the model case. In 1904, it was reported that a “quantity” of Funtumia seed was being
collected for planting nurseries in the Eastern and Cross River Divisions. The Para trees that
had been planted “some years ago” in the botanical gardens were “progressing favourably,” having
reached 30 feet in height.64 In 1904, 227,155 Funtumia seedlings were transplanted from nurseries
in the Eastern Division; in 1905, this number was 119,800, the difference being due to “defective
seed.”65 Ten acres were planted in the Mamu reserve (in present day Anambara State) in 1906.66
The same year, James reported that in the Eastern Provinces, “little [had] been done in the way
of making plantations of rubber.” A few European firms had planted Funtumia but he felt that
there had been “no active interest taken in the matter by the natives, who as a rule appear[ed] to
be fully engaged in the palm oil trade” (ibid).
In 1908, Thorburn, the Colonial Secretary, wrote that small plantations of both Para and Fun-
tumia had been made at the district headquarters in the Eastern Provinces.67 The same year,
the sixteen-year old Para trees in the Ebute-Metta Gardens were tapped for the first time and
gave rubber “very favourably reported on by the Imperial Institute.” The curator of the botanical
gardens at Calabar similarly reported that the Para plantation there showed “magnificent growth”
(ibid). By 1909, it was calculated that there were 30,000 Para plants in the Eastern Provinces, in
addition to 10,000 seedlings sold to individuals. That year, 1,232 Para plants were added to the
Mamu reserve, 6 more acres were put to Para at Ilaro, and 1,200 Para trees were planted in the
Oshun reserve.68 These were extended again in 1910 and 1911.69 In 1910, 12 new plantations were
created with 22,000 seedlings in the Niger division.70 In addition, in 1911, 155 “native communal
rubber plantations,” were created in the Western Province, and communal Ceara plantations were
started in the drier areas of the Central Province, though it was recognized that at that time there
no known “satisfactory and remunerative” method of extracting the latex.71
63Southern Nigeria Annual Report for 1903.
64Southern Nigeria Annual Report for 1904.
65Southern Nigeria Annual Report for 1905.
66Southern Nigeria Annual Report for 1906.
67Southern Nigeria Annual Report for 1908.
68Southern Nigeria Annual Report for 1909.
69Southern Nigeria Annual Reports for 1910 and 1911.
70Southern Nigeria Annual Report for 1910.
71Southern Nigeria Annual Report for 1911.
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The communal plantations in Benin were initially seen as promising, and were strongly encour-
aged by colonial officials. Since Igbafe (1979) relied on the colony’s annual reports as his primary
sources, this is the positive picture he leaves with his readers. In 1904, Egerton saw the boom in
the rubber market and the development of trade as “gratifying.” While he felt it would be long
before the prices paid for Nigerian rubber were at all close to those paid for rubber from the Straits
and Ceylon, “as the cultivation is extended improved methods of preparation will undoubtedly
be introduced with beneficial results.”72 He noted that experiments were in progress to improve
tapping, since the existing method used by Africans was seen as “most injurious and in fact respon-
sible for the death of numbers of trees.” He had little doubt that the future of rubber depended on
the cultivation of rubber in the Western and Central Provinces, 214 plantations having been made
that year, containing 227,155 trees.73 In 1905, Fosbery reported that rubber continued to show a
“considerable increase,” predicting that “with systematic cultivation and collection it will become
a valuable addition to the exports of the country.”74 The same year, Para seeds were imported
from the Cameroons and the Straits; only the latter germinated, but produced 120 plants from 140
seeds (ibid). In 1906, two pupils had just returned from the French School of Forestry in Sudan.75
In 1906, existing plantations of Funtumia were extended in reserves in the Central Province;
that year, 368 plantations with 167,135 plants were made in the Benin Districts.76 Thompson
pointed out that, at that time, 916 plantations with 678,000 plants existed in the Central Province,
in addition to 134 plantations with 80,000 plants in what had earlier been the Central Division.77
These were laid out in rows 3 to 7 feet apart or closer.78 A large number of seeds were sown that
year in Benin City, with the expectation that the young plants would be later distributed to the
various district headquarters. The plants in the Forest Office compound had, by then, reached 12 to
15 feet (ibid). In 1908, there were 2,251 Funtumia plantations in the Central Province, containing
1,125,972 trees, many of which were old enough to be tapped.79 In the Benin City district that
year 154,000 trees were added to the communal plantations.80
In 1910, the success of the communal plantations in Benin inspired 24 villages in the Ilesha Dis-
trict as well as some additional communities in the Ijebu-Ode and Epe Districts to start plantations
of their own.81 The same year, 60,000 new Funtumia seedlings were added to existing plantations
in the Central Province (ibid). In 1911, 224 new villages were planted out in 63,753 Funtumia
seedlings, and 4,133 Para plants were put out under the same scheme. 68,000 Para seeds were
distributed in the Central Province; 11,000 were sold, 18,000 distributed to the village communal
plantations, 28,200 to the Benin City Chiefs’ plantation, and 10,400 to the Forestry compound
in Benin City. In 1912, “numerous communal rubber plantations were examined” in the Central
72Southern Nigeria Annual Report for 1904.
73Southern Nigeria Annual Report for 1904.
74Southern Nigeria Annual Report for 1905.
75Report on the Forest Administration of Southern Nigeria for 1906.
76Southern Nigeria Annual Report for 1906.
77Report on the Forest Administration of Southern Nigeria for 1906.
78NAI, Ben Prof 2/1 BP 364 1914: Report on the Communal Rubber Plantations for 1914 (1913).
79Southern Nigeria Annual Report for 1908.
80Southern Nigeria Annual Report for 1909.
81Southern Nigeria Annual Report for 1910.
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Province, with arrangements made for extending them.82 In 1914, the plantations in Asaba Division
planted between 1906 and 1912 were reported to be between 1/3 and 3.5 acres.83
In 1910, the several thousand Funtumia communal plantations had become large enough to tap.84
Tapping and rubber preparation were done under the supervision of the Forest Department, and
in the presence of the owners. To coagulate the latex, the rubber was boiled, and then rolled into
thin biscuits using a wooden roller on a table. The rubber was washed throughout with hot water.
These biscuits were then hung for drying and smoked in a long drying shed. The amber-colored
biscuits were reported to be of “the first quality,” produced “by means of simple appliances that
can easily be procured by the natives,” and were sold for 6s 6d per lb despite a falling market
on which only the best Para could fetch more than 6s per lb.85 This was seen as a “very great
improvement on the usual quality of rubber exported from Southern Nigeria.” In 1911, the Chief
Conservator of Forests inspected several of the communal rubber plantations in which tapping and
rubber preparation were underway. His impression was that some of these were “very fine examples
of their kind and should eventually form valuable native estates.”86
4706 trees from 84 communal plantations were tapped in the Benin City district in 1910, 20,210
trees from 300 plantations in 1911, and 386 plantations were tapped in 1913.87 The yield for 1911
was 1,885 lbs and 11 oz of dry rubber.88 In 1912, the tapping of the communal plantations ran from
May to October, and the rubber was sold locally the following March. 2,988 lbs of “good rubber”
were sold at 3s 4d per lb, and 43 lbs of “tackey rubber” was sold for 2s 10d. Two thirds of these
revenues were paid to the communities and chiefs.89 In 1913, 5,612 lbs of rubber were exported from
the communal plantations.90 Tapping during 1913 was done between May and November, overseen
by “native staff” of the Forest Department, along with Ogas (headmen), who supervised groups
of ten to twenty villagers using Para knives.91 The staff encompassed the Assistant Conservator
of Forests, an interpreter, a forester, ten Forest Guards, five pupils, and five Ogas.92 In 1914,
certificates were issued so that each village had one certified headman, “responsible for the upkeep
and cleaning of his plantation” (ibid).
4.3.2. Problems. Outside observers were impressed with these plantations; Christy (1911) reported
that “[t]he system of native communal plantations so successful in Southern Nigeria is admirable,
and should be adopted by all the west African colonies.” In reality, however, several problems were
already apparent. One of the most notable difficulties they faced was labor scarcity. Usuanlele (nd)
has made this argument, interpreting Benin as a “land abundant” region; this mode of analysis for
82Southern Nigeria Annual Report for 1912.
83BP 294 1914 Communal Rubber Plantations - Asaba.
84Southern Nigeria Annual Report for 1910.
85Ibid. The report states that only the best para could fetch 6d per lb, but this is clearly a typographical error.
86Southern Nigeria Annual Report for 1911.
87Southern Nigeria Annual Report for 1911, NAI Ben Prof 2/1 BP 364 1914: Report on the Communal Rubber
Plantations for 1914 (1913).
88Southern Nigeria Annual Report for 1911.
89Southern Nigeria Annual Report for 1912.
90NAI, BP 5 1915: Report on the Tapping Operations on the Communal Rubber Plantations for 1914.
91NAI, Ben Prof 2/1 BP 364 1914: Report on the Communal Rubber Plantations for 1914 (1913).
92NAI, BP 5 1915: Report on the Tapping Operations on the Communal Rubber Plantations for 1914.
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Africa as a whole has been recently revitalized by Austin (2008). The population density of Benin
was estimated at only 25 per sqm in 1927.93 I begin my discussion of the problems faced by the
communal plantations by adding more evidence in favor of this view.
The problem of labor scarcity in the Benin territories was apparent as early as 1901. That year,
the Annual Report for Southern Nigeria noted that recent “changes in the social conditions of the
natives of these territories, particularly with regard to slavery, render it certain that the capacity of
these native carriers for their transport work is not likely to increase, at all events for some years to
come, until a good native labour market is established.”94 The colonial response was to enact the
House Rule Ordinance. This was initially intended to maintain the reciprocal obligations between
House heads and members in the Niger Delta; in its actual application, however, the Ordinance
made it easier for the state to rely on Benin chiefs to requisition labor, since the law enabled them
to bring those who refused work before the Native Court (Igbafe, 1975). In 1906, similarly, the
Provincial Forest Officer reported that the Sobos95 were too involved in road-making to devote
much time to plantations; where rubber had been taken up, palm oil had been abandoned.96
Like other colonial projects in Benin (and indeed, throughout Africa), it was expected that the
communal plantations would be worked with unpaid labor (Usuanlele, nd). Without pay, it became
difficult to recruit workers. The 1913 Report on the Communal Rubber Plantations detailed five
major problems that were causing them to fail: first, the weakened authority of the local chiefs;
second, competing labor demand from other sectors, such as timber areas, government works, road
construction, and porterage; third, insufficient incentives for the local communities, even when the
government waived its one third claim to the plantations’ revenue in that year; fourth, villagers’
lack of experience with the product, which was made worse by deferred payoff of rubber as a tree
crop, and; fifth, sharp labor demands that conflicted with seasonal festivals and funerals.97 Results
on the model plantations, similarly, could only be achieved by “constantly worrying” the Obaseki
and Edosomah for labor (ibid). In 1915, the government punished the Ero, Oshodi, and Obaseki
for not weeding their plantations by withholding royalties (Usuanlele, nd). While initially proposed
as a year-to-year arrangement, the waiving of the government’s share of the revenues soon became
permanent.98
The next year, the a report on the communal plantations noted that it was difficult getting
upkeep work done:
The village people have shown very plainly that they do not care for the planta-
tions. The Forest guards report that they have the greatest difficulty in getting any
cleaning or clearing done. At Uburu Uku the forest Guards had been driven away
when they attempted to get the plantations cleaned. ... At Ogwashi Uku and Abah
93NAI, CSO 26 09125 Assessment Report on Benin Division.
94Southern Nigeria Annual Report for 1901.
95A colonial term that erroneously joined the Isoko and Urhobo together.
96Report on the Forest Administration of Southern Nigeria for 1906.
97NAI, Ben Prof 2/1 BP 364 1914: Report on the Communal Rubber Plantations for 1914 (1913).
98NAI, BP 76 1914: Communal Plantations Central Province; 16 Dec, 1913: Colonial Secretary to Conservator of
Forests.
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very few men would be persuaded to do the work which was done almost entirely
by the Forest Guards.99
Similarly, in Ishan, the people were disinclined to do the work requested, and officials felt they
had been wasting their time. Especially in Asaba, Ifon and Ishan, officials had difficulty getting
men to work rubber. Many chiefs complained that, “as their power had been broken, it was hardly
fair to make them responsible for the boys not working...they consider it very unfair to be held
responsible for the work when the Government has taken away their power.” (ibid). In addition to
the work of tapping and upkeep, processing was labor intensive. Latex had to be cooked at central
cooking camps and let stand for eighteen hours or more before it was ready to cook. For people from
outlying villages, this was not worth the time involved, and they would not stay behind to learn
how to properly cook the rubber (ibid). Officials recognized that their own labor requisitioning
contributed to this scarcity of labor – the same report noted that the question of carriers “has been
a difficult one. The Assistant Conservator of Forests is obliged to find his own carriers, except on
leaving a station, to take him from village to village. These carriers are not paid and this does not
help to make the rubber business any more popular.” In 1916, the Resident pointed out that it
was not worthwhile for villages to send small quantities of rubber to Benin, and that they did not
do so voluntarily.100
This was not the only difficulty faced by the plantations. While the proceeds of the plantations
were supposedly to be split between the government and the local communities, it appears that
their benefits went largely to the chiefs. This was true also of the model Para plantation on the
road between Benin City and Sapele, which was owned by eighteen Benin City chiefs who had
“provided the labour for it free.”101 Lugard, similarly, believed that “communal” labor generally
meant “forced” labor, and opposed the communal plantations on these grounds (Egboh, 1985,
p. 160). In 1924, the Resident chastised the Oba for hiring practices on his Para plantation,
requesting the District Officer to inform him that if his workers were “called upon to work for
nothing, it simply means that they will leave their villages, and either seek employment with the
timber concessionaires or elsewhere outside the division.”102 Bradbury (1973) notes that chiefs
received one third of the wages paid for laborers they requisitioned, and received a share of the
profits from rubber. Some were still profiting from these plantations as late as 1960, though he
noted that this hurt their political legitimacy.
A plantation established by the Forestry Department near Usonigbe had been turned over to the
local villages around 1910, but in 1914 was appropriated by the Oba. His successor was leasing it
to Palmer for tapping in 1937.103 A Para plantation on Sapele Road that had been damaged by
fire was turned over to the Iyashere in 1916, since he was the only chief who had shown interest
99NAI, BP 5 1915: Report on the Tapping Operations on the Communal Rubber Plantations for 1914.
100NAI, Ben Prof 2/3 BP 523 1916: Proceeds from Rubber Sales; no date given, letter to Secretary, Southern
Provinces.
101NAI, Ben Prof 2/1 BP 364 1914: Report on the Communal Rubber Plantations for 1914 (1913).
102NAI, Ben Prof 2/4 BP 262 1917: Para Rubber, Benin Division. 18 Feb, 1924: Resident to District Officer.
103NAI, Ben Dist 1 BD 84 Vol 2: Usonigbe Native Court and District Affairs: 16 March, 1937: Palmer to DO;
handwritten note by Jull.
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in it and it was through the disinterest of other chiefs that it had come to be damaged.104 One
official remarked that “looking at it from a business profit and loss point of view the communal
plantations have so far been a failure, except to the chiefs.”105 Usuanlele (nd), similarly, observes
that Benin chiefs were also able to turn timber royalties, intended to benefit the whole community,
into personal incomes. Not all revenues failed to produce public benefits, however; Dennett told
the WALC that the Native Council in Benin used some of its share of rubber revenues to finance
the city’s waterworks (WALC, 1916, p. 393).
In addition, the colonial state was short on staff and equipment, to the detriment of the plan-
tations. The supply of seed was not always reliable; seeds imported from Cameroon failed to
germinate, while in it was reported that poor germination had lowered the number of Funtumia
planted in Southern Nigeria from 234,878 in 1907 to 133,094 in 1908. Of the 622 plantations formed
during that year, most were extensions to existing ones.106 This plagued other experiments with
rubber. Experiments with rubber tapping in the Ibadan State Reserve in 1906 failed due “to the
want of sufficient European supervision.”107 In the Ibadan and Mamu reserves, the small staff
made it impossible to tap all the trees even once, “let alone a second and third time, during the
season as was originally contemplated.”108 In 1910, the Agricultural and Forestry departments
were separated, and von Hellermann (2005, p. 112) argues that the Forestry Department quickly
lost interest in agricultural pursuits such as these plantations. Before 1911, thinning had been
neglected, and the trees needed each other’s support to stand.109 At Agbor and Adaba, while
thinning was desperately needed, there was no staff to do the work. The report for 1913 on the
communal plantations in Benin admitted neglect by the government, stating that “it is a breach of
good faith and fair dealing to have started these rubber plantations as a native industry and leave
them, now when maturing and needing thinning, tapping etc under European supervision” (ibid).
The District Officer worried that the villages were “disappointed with the results of their la-
bor.”110 In Ishan in 1913, the Forestry Department was “unable” to tap the 93 communal planta-
tions.111 At times, one Forest Guard and one pupil had to supervise as many as twenty men.112
That year, the senior Conservator of Forests decided to suspend tapping on the plantations, “on the
ground that the trees need rest, and the Forestry Department is short of officers” (ibid). In 1917,
there were no funds available to supervise preparation and assist in the sale of rubber at Ubiaja;
the District Officer proposed turning the village plantations over to their respective chiefs.113
104NAI, Ben Prof 2/5 BP 173/1916 Communal Rubber Plantation Management of. 9 Nov, 1916: Conservator of
Forests Benin Circle to Resident Benin Province.
105NAI, BP 5 1915: Report on the Tapping Operations on the Communal Rubber Plantations for 1914.
106Southern Nigeria Annual Report for 1908.
107Southern Nigeria Annual Report for 1906.
108Southern Nigeria Annual Report for 1912.
109NAI, Ben Prof 2/1 BP 364 1914: Report on the Communal Rubber Plantations for 1914 (1913).
110NAI, BP 138 1914: Annual Reports Benin Province.
111NAI, BP 138 1914: Annual Reports Benin Province.
112NAI, BP 5 1915: Report on the Tapping Operations on the Communal Rubber Plantations for 1914.
113NAI, Ben Prof 2/4: BP 403 17: Village Rubber Plantation, 3 July, 1917: District Officer Ubiaja to Resident,
Benin and 9 Aug, 1917: Resident to Distirct Officer Ubiaja.
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In 1917, the government had to borrow pans, metal spoons, tapping knives, rollers, cog wheels,
fittings, and bottles of acetic acid from Miller Brothers.114 Local tapping knives were described
as “slow and bad,” though by 1914 a local “native imitation” of Para knives had been devised.115
Smoking facilities too were inadequate, and could not prevent the cured rubber from becoming
moldy.116 The two smoking sheds at Benin City were poorly built, lacked proper heating and
drying facilities, and were in constant danger of catching fire.117
It was also difficult for the colonial government to transmit new knowledge and skills to Nigerians.
The government needed to transmit new ideas of plantation management, instructions on better
tapping methods, and inducements to produce higher quality output. Much of the plant distribution
had to be done from the Onisha Gardens. As early as 1906, it was recognized that this was a poor
location relative to the Central Province. It was too dry and too far from the centers in which cocoa
and Para rubber could be successfully cultivated.118 Para yields were estimated to be five times
greater than those for Funtumia per acre, but there were only 6,000 acres in Southern Nigeria
by 1922 (Egboh, 1985, p. 162). One officer reported in 1913 that the “native idea of a clean
plantation is often opposed to all Forest ideas of soil protection and the arrival of a Forest Officer
often leads to the plantation being swept and scraped bare of all needful and protecting surface
soil and humus.”119 Individual rubber samples mentioned in colonial correspondence were often
poor – in 1918 samples of locally grown rubber were reported to be “anything but good, and it
is evident if the best results are to be obtained, that the Beni ‘Planter’ requires both advice and
supervision.”120
The quality of Nigerian rubber, among the worst in the world after the Second World War
(Anschel, 1965), was an issue throughout both the wild and plantation rubber periods. In 1906, it
was reported that “up to the present practically the whole of the rubber exported is forest produce,
rudely prepared by the native with little or no intelligent control of the collection.”121 Thomspon
added that improving the quality of rubber had encountered difficulty, though some progress had
been made.122 At that time, most Funtumia was shipped as either “Lagos lump” or “Benin lump,”
containing a very large percentage of water and impurities” (ibid). Efforts were being made to
replace these lumps with biscuits, which were easier to dry and better resisted rotting. Generally,
heat, lime juice, or an infusion of costus lucanusianus was used as a coagulant. Funtumia would
spontaneously coagulate in three days to a week if exposed to air in a shallow vessel. He suggested
that alcohol, acetic acid, and boiled Bauhinia leaves would accelerate the process, improve quality,
114NAI, Ben Prof 2/4 BP 262 1917: Para Rubber, Benin Division.
115NAI, Ben Prof 2/1 BP 364 1914: Report on the Communal Rubber Plantations for 1914 (1913).
116NAI, Ben Prof 2/4 BP 270 1917: Sale of Village Rubber Plantation, 28 March, 1917: District Officer to Resident.
117NAI, Ben Prof 2/1 BP 364 1914: Report on the Communal Rubber Plantations for 1914 (1913).
118Southern Nigeria Annual Report for 1906.
119NAI, Ben Prof 2/1 BP 364 1914: Report on the Communal Rubber Plantations for 1914 (1913).
120NAI, Ben Prof 2/4 BP 262 1917: Para Rubber, Benin Division. 12 Dec, 1917: Herald to Watt.
121Southern Nigeria Annual Report for 1906.
122Report on the Forest Administration of Southern Nigeria for 1906.
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and lead to higher prices. In addition, inferior latex from a variety of other plants was used to
adulterate the latex.123
For producers, there was little incentive to improve quality; this was also an issue for wild rubber
as well. Egboh (1985, p. 166) describes similar quality problems in the Lagos hinterland. While
rubber produced in French West Africa using chemicals available from local plants fetched 54d
per lb in Europe, “Lagos lump” could was only valued at 18d to 24d per lb. In 1907, Thomspon
reported that “with one exception, the European firms trading in this produce have not encouraged
the movement to the extent they might have done by paying substantially better prices for the
improved article.”124 Similarly, in 1909, another official complained that, while all licensees and
Ogas were instructed in the “proper method” of making rubber, the Yorubas “simply refuse to
do it, as they can sell bad rubber near Illushi even if not at Siluko or Benin City.”125 Though an
ordinance to control the adulteration of produce had been passed the previous year, Miller Brothers
complained that the amount of rubber then fell; Unwin’s view was that “the natives, especially
Yorubas just tried to see how long the firms would hold out before giving way, after two months the
whole thing was reversed and they were told that they could make lump rubber.” A “vacillating
policy” from Miller Brothers and indifference from the other European firms made it difficult to
convince Africans that quality biscuits, as opposed to lumps, were actually wanted.
The Imperial Institute analysed several Nigerian rubber samples in 1908.126 While comparable
fine hard Para was selling for 3s 512d per lb, Benin lump was valued between 1s 6d and 1s 11d.
Three specimens of Funtumia from Benin City “were of rough appearance but of satisfactory
composition,” valued from 2s 8d to 3s 8d per lb, with comparable fine hard Para selling at 4s 6d
per lb and Benin lump at 2s 0d.
The same year, experiments were conducted to improve the quality of Nigerian rubber.127 Strain-
ing the latex for impurities, washing it once it was freshly coagulated, and cutting it into thin strips
that could be more easily dried in wood smoke created a product that could be sold in England for
between 4s 6d and 4s 8d a lb, when Brazilian Para could fetch a price of 5s 2d (ibid). This was
achieved using simple articles that it was hoped could be obtained by Africans – demijohns, earthen
pots, a sieve, empty bottles, and the like. These were demonstrated to the rangers, forester, forest
guards and pupils in the hope that they would pass these methods onto others. James, optimisti-
cally, assumed the price of Nigerian rubber could be doubled by such efforts, so long as these higher
prices could be passed onto producers and adulteration policed (ibid).
Two African Rangers were sent to French West Africa, and returned in 1907 on a lecture tour
that did encourage some quality biscuit production in Benin, but only 35.5 lbs were actually
offered for sale (Egboh, 1985, p. 166-7). Biscuits took twice as long to produce and lost weight
more rapidly than lump rubber; one official estimated that it would require 4s per lb to induce
producers to switch (ibid.). The Adulteration of Produce Ordinance of 1897 was used between
123Thompson listed carpodinus hirsuta and carpodinius fulvis (funtumia africana, hoarrhena wulfsbergii, alstonia
confensis, omphalocarpum elatum, couonopharyngia pachysiphon, omphalogonum calophyllum) as adulterants.
124NAUK, CO520/50:30 Nov, 1907: Rubber Collection (Egerton to Elgin).
125NAUK, CO 520/83, Enc. 25 Sept, 1909: Unwin to Thompson.
126Southern Nigeria Annual Report for 1908.
127Southern Nigeria Annual Report for 1906.
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1907 to 1909 to prevent producers from producing lump rubber, but this was quickly withdrawn
due to protests from European firms who faced declining supplies. Egerton’s similar proposal to
forbid lump exports in 1910 was opposed by the colonial office (ibid.). In 1908 it was reported
that attempts to improve the quality of rubber had been “rendered futile, owing, principally, to the
unwillingness of the merchants to pay for the inspection and supervision of the rubber tappers and
to the reluctance of the Government to follow the lead of neighbouring Governments and prohibit
the sale or export of lump rubber.”128 In 1910, the quality of lump rubber was improved, and
this was sustained through 1911, the product receiving a price of 1s 6d per lb.129 In 1909, the
government proposed charging local firms a fee of 1 or 2d per lb to mount an instruction campaign,
but this was withdrawn following on opposition from the Liverpool Chamber of Commerce (Egboh,
1985, p. 168). In 1913, however, there was a falling off in exports “owing to the very poor prices
offered for the low grade of rubber shipped”.130 That year, prices for Ishan rubber were said to be
low due to “its inferior quality and large percentage of impurities; also owing to the large quantities
of good plantation rubber now on the market.”131 The quality of Nigerian rubber did not improve
– one 1918 textbook described “Benin ball” as “generally dirty,” having “rotten, woody smell”
(Pearson, 1918).
Finally, the return to rubber fell sharply once Asian production began to increase. Some inklings
of these were felt even before 1910; in 1908, it was reported that there was a “marked falling off”
in rubber exports was “mainly due to the poor prices offered for the produce owing to the general
trade depression prevailing in the home markets.”132 In 1912, both cocoa and rubber were said to
have suffered from the shortest rainfall in many years. The First World War did not help prices
either. Officials realized that the failure to anticipate the collapse of the world market has a major
oversight on their part; the 1914 report on the communal plantations noted that:
The possibility, in fact probability of a fall in the price of rubber was evidently not
taken into consideration when these operations were started...A second and very
important point is that the natives have not taken up the plantations with much
enthusiasm. Every year the returns have been smaller and, most important of all,
the natives have been kept waiting many months before receiving payment.133
Eventually, the government admitted its failure. The same report recommended turning the
plantations over to the local villages, noting that it would not be remunerative to work them with
paid labor. In 1916, the Forestry Department ceased to exercise any control over the communal
plantations, and the commissioner of the Benin Province requested the District Officer to inform
the “native owners” that, since the government “has given them practical instruction in the method
of planting, tapping, and preparing the rubber in those plantations, it is now their duty to carry on
128Southern Nigeria Annual Report for 1909.
129Southern Nigeria Annual Report for 1911.
130Southern Nigeria Annual Report for 1913.
131NAI, BP 138 1914: Annual Reports Benin Province.
132Southern Nigeria Annual Report for 1908.
133NAI, BP 5 1915: Report on the Tapping Operations on the Communal Rubber Plantations for 1914.
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the work themselves without regular supervision and assistance.”134 Proceeds were then divided
between the Native Authority and the villages.135 In 1918, the District Officer for Benin asked
the Resident about his meeting with the local agent for Miller Brothers, concerning the continued
purchase of rubber. “If there is no market for the Native Administration Rubber,” he warned
“tapping should cease temporarily and the trees be allowed to rest.”136 The export market had
collapsed. It was then “impossible to import rubber into the United Kingdom.” Miller Bros were
unable to ship rubber from Sapele to Great Britain. He sighed:
It appears that rubber will not keep in this country, and unless a market can be
found for the rubber products of the communal rubber plantations and the para
plantations, it would appear to be a waste of both time and money to continue
tapping and preparing rubber, as is now being done by the Native Administration
(ibid).
In 1921, the Director of Agriculture wrote his above-quoted memorandum making the abandon-
ment of rubber official government policy.
4.3.3. Cost benefit analysis. Were the communal plantations a worthwhile endeavor? One approach
to answering this is to use cost-benefit analysis to piece together a reasonable distribution for the
rate of return that colonial officials should have expected at the outset. Anschel (1965) uses a
budget study of 22 Para farms to ask whether year-to-year profits in rubber are greater than those
for a palm plantation, and to show how sensitive the answer is to 10% and 20% changes in the price
of rubber and to overall costs. There are two major shortcomings of this approach. First, because
year-to-year profits are delayed relative to the costs of establishing a plantation, this method does
nothing to discount these future returns. Second, the sensitivity analysis only allows for very crude
shifts in profits and costs, giving little sense of the riskiness of rubber as an investment.
The approach I take is to calculate a plausible distribution for the internal rate of return (IRR).
Suppose that the fixed cost of establishing a one-acre Funtumia plantation in the first year is F ; I
assume constant returns to scale and calculate all figures in per-acre values. Suppose further that,
from the plantation’s maturity in year M until the end of its lifespan L, it yields a year-to-year
operating profit of pi. The plantation’s net present value (NPV ) will then be given by:







The IRR will be the value of r such that the NPV is zero. In order to find a reasonable a
priori distribution on r, I break F and pi into their components, and represent these as functions
of unknown parameters. I assume distributions on these parameters, and simulate 3000 draws of
them, producing this many draws of the IRR. I begin by assuming that, while land for planting is
free, establishment costs come from the labor required to clear and plant it:
134NAI, Ben Prof 2/5 BP 173/1916 Communal Rubber Plantation Management of, 2 March, 1916: Commissioner
Benin Province to District Officer.
135See, e.g. NAI, Ben Prof 2/3 BP 523 1916: Proceeds from Rubber Sales.
136NAI, Ben Prof 2/4 BP 262 1917: Para Rubber, Benin Division; 4 July, 1918: DO to Resident.
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F = Cost of labor in clearing + Cost of labor in planting(2)
= Man-days clearing per acre×Wage + Man-days planting per acre×Wage
= c1× w + c2× w.
Operating profits, by contrast, are revenues minus the annual cost of tapping, plantation main-
tenance or upkeep, and processing:
pi = Revenue− Cost of Tapping− Cost of Upkeep− Cost of Processing(3)
= Producer price× Trees per acre×Yield per tree
SKIP− Trees per acre×Man-days per tapper×Wage
Trees per tapper
SKIP−Man-days upkeep per acre×Wage
SKIP− (1 + Equipment multiplier)×
SKIP TWICE(Trees per acre×Yield per tree×Man-days processing per lb×Wage)
= p× t× y − t×D1× w
T
−D2× w − (1 + E)× (t× y ×D3× w).
Rather than accounting for capital costs and depreciation, I have assumed that equipment (such
as smoking facilities) adds a premium above the labor cost of processing. Table 1 reports the
distributions assumed for each of the thirteen parameters needed to produce these estimates. These
are based on scattered observations taken from archival and other sources, which are detailed in
Appendix A. When my knowledge of these is weak, I have tried to assume a diffuse distribution. If
the simulated value of pi is negative, I set the IRR to 0. Since Nigeria was a small producer in the
global market, I assume no general equilibrium effects. Because the IRR evaluates a single project,
I do not need to consider the rate of return to alternate projects when calculating it. Rather, if
I want to know whether land would be better planted to yams, I should compare the IRR from
rubber to the IRR from yams.
Figure 2 gives the results of this exercise. In spite of reasonably optimistic assumptions on the
price distribution, the communal plantations were indeed a risky proposition. In roughly 26% of
simulations, the internal rate of return is zero. The average of the non-zero realizations, however,
is fairly high, at roughly 63%. At the median of the parameters, it is just under 48%. This is
because, while establishment costs were low, year-to-year revenues were highly uncertain.
Establishment costs are small on average, running a little under £7. The main difficulty is that
the mean revenue of slightly more than £185 is eaten up by year-to-year costs. On average, tapping
costs take up 48% of total revenue. This is remarkably close to the one half share paid to itinerant
tappers during the 1960s, especially when considering that under some arrangements only sheets
would be equally divided, while all the revenue from lumps would go to the tappers (Blanckenburg,
1965). Annual upkeep accounts for less than 1% of revenue in a typical year. The fatal expense is





M Years to maturity U[5,10]
L Lifespan of plantation U[20,30]
t Trees per acre U[1000,2000]
y Annual yield per tree in lbs U[0.5,1.5]
Labor requirements
c1 Man-days clearing per acre U[50,150]
c2 Man-days planting per acre U[25,75]
T Trees per tapper U[100,200]
D1 Man-days per tapper U[100,200]
D2 Man-days annual upkeep U[10,30]
D3 Man-days processing per lb U[0.1,0.7]
E Equipment multiplier U[0.5,1.5]
Prices
p Producer price in d per lb U[10,50]
w Wage in pence per man-day U[6,15]
On average, they are £66. This is also reasonable from a back-of-the-envelope perspective. If, on
average, a plantation spends half of its gross revenue on tapping, the price of rubber must be twice
the expense of processing it in order to turn a profit. Where processing facilities were dispersed,
output quality was low, and labor scarce, this condition was unlikely to be met.
4.4. Summary. The problems of plantation rubber in Benin are, like the difficulties faced with
wild rubber, of broader relevance. In the Amazon, it has been frequently argued that the region fell
behind Asia because plantation rubber was not established. Resor (1977) suggests that plantations
were uneconomical in Brazil because the Para grew better in Asia. Dependency theorists attribute
the failure of Brazilian plantations to surplus extracted abroad from the wild rubber industry, while
Marxists point to social relationships as constraints, and Warren Dean theorized that endemic leaf
blight was the principle obstacle (Coomes and Barham, 1994). In Benin, the lack of incentives
for foreign investment were similar to other peasant-dominated industries throughout West Africa,
and were determined in part by policy hostile to concessions. Like cotton in Mozambique or
terracing in East Africa, success of the project assumed that Africans would be willing to provide
elastic supplies of labor in return for little compensation, and these demands were resisted. Other
colonial labor demands, notably the requisitioning of carriers, competed with the needs of the
plantations. Finally, vulnerability to the global market hurt Nigerian rubber, much as with other
African economies dependent on exports of primary commodities.
5. Conclusion
This was not the end for the rubber industry in Benin. The government abandoned its sup-
port of the industry in 1921. After 1935, however, planting took off and exports began to grow.
Anschel (1965) believed that this was due to increases in the global price of rubber that followed
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Figure 2. Simulation results
Notes: The top graph shows the CDF of the internal rate of return produced by the simulations. The mean of the
nonzero IRRs is given by a vertical line. The bottom panel gives the CDF of the simulated operating profits (in
pounds). The mean (including negative values) is marked with a vertical line.
on international supply restrictions (of which Nigeria was not a party). As pointed out above,
however, the prices of the 1930s were below those that prevailed to 1910, and were low during the
early years of the planting boom. Usuanlele (nd) suggests instead that the impetus for planting
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came from colonial demands for taxes, paid in cash, from land alienation for forest reserves against
which plantations of tree crops were a viable defence, from urban residents looking for investment
opportunities, and from migrant peasants looking for new sources of income. Indeed, the rapid
expansion of forest reserves is one of the dominant themes of Benin’s history from 1916 to 1938
(von Hellermann and Usuanlele, 2009). In addition to tree crops as a Lockean claim on land, this
changed the factor ratio making labor less relatively scarce (Usuanlele, nd). The British supported
both plantation and wild rubber during the war, but were ambivalent to its future prospects. Their
concerns notwithstanding, Benin’s rubber exports continued to rise through independence, peaking
in 1914.
In this paper I have argued that geography is not destiny, and that agency does not always
lead to rapid adoption of new crops and technologies. Institutions, governance, information, and
inequality can all prevent or delay the success of an industry. In the case of Bini rubber, the British
could not replace existing property rights with institutions that encouraged preservation of natural
resources. The British could not forecast the world market and plan accordingly, nor were they
effectively able to pass new skills onto Nigerians. Neither expatriate firms nor Nigerians had the
information needed to forecast profits with reasonable security. Officials expected the bulk of the
necessary work to come from those who stood to benefit the least. It should not be surprising,
then, that the Nigerian rubber industry was so slow to develop.
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Appendix A. Parameter Observations
Below, I have abbreviated Southern Nigeria Annual Report as SNAR, Report on the Forest
Administration of Southern Nigeria as RFASN, BP 5 1915: Report on the Tapping Operations
on the Communal Rubber Plantations for 1914 as BP5/1915, and BP 364 1914: Report on the
Communal Rubber Plantations for 1914 as BP364/1914.
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M (Years to maturity): That the communal plantations were first tapped in 1910 suggests they
took roughly 7 years to mature. Christy (1911, p. 96) states that Funtumia will give a fair yield in
its sixth year.
L (Lifespan of plantation): I have no observations, so I have assumed 30 as a reasonable guess.
For Para, Anschel (1965, p. 145) assumes planting starts in the sixth year and continues for 24
more years.
t (Trees per acre): Christy (1911, p. 108); Funtumia in Benin City plantations was planted 4
to 6 ft apart, implying roughly 1750 per acre. He also notes (p. 97) that 3 or 4 times as many
Funtumia can be planted per acre as Para. Blanckenburg (1965) reported average Para densities
of 300 to 500 per acre (trees planted on average 9 to 15 ft apart). Igbafe (1979, p. 346) states that
there were 256 plantations containing 142,978 trees and covering 118 acres (1212 trees per acre) in
1907.
y (Annual yield per tree in lbs): RFASN 1906; 2 to 3 oz per tree per tapping. SNAR 1910; 1.402
oz per tapping for trees over 18 inches. SNAR 1911; 1.59 oz per tree. Bell (1907); 1 lb of tree
per year expected from Funtumia in Uganda. Blanckenburg (1965) states that “low yielding local
varieties” give 200-400 lbs of dry rubber per acre per year, while “improved varieties” give up to
1200 lbs (though he is likely referring to Para for both). He quotes the Ministry of Agriculture’s
estimate of 200 lbs per acre, and believes in his study villages it is closer to 300. Christy (1911,
p. 181-187) gives results from tapping on several Kamerun plantations, but does not clearly state
whether the results are for a single tapping, or annual; in the one instance where he gives an annual
figure (p. 186), he suggests that between 2 and 6 oz per year is possible per year depending on the
height of tapping for excision tapping, incision tapping (p. 189) gave 1 lb of dry rubber over twelve
months. His own summary (p.193) suggests that in years 6 through 10, a Funtumia tree will give
4, 5, 9, 12 and 15 oz of dry rubber per year. BP5/1915 gives yields in Benin, Ifon and Ishan that
correspond to 0.06, 0.05, and 0.08 lbs per tree, respectively. BP364/1914 gives yield figures per
tree tapped of 1 to 1.6 lb. Egboh (1985, p. 162) suggests that Funtumia yields were generally 60
lbs per acre, as opposed to more than 300 for Para.
c1 (Man-days clearing per acre): Forde et al. (1946) estimate that clearing in ecologically-similar
Yorubaland takes 42 to 98 man-days per acre. For Benin, they do not give man-day estimates;
clearing, seed, and weeding together on a 4.35 acre cocoa farm cost £12/7/6 over 3 years. On a 5
acre garm in Benin, the total costs of clearing were £10. These suggest clearing costs of £2 to 3
per acre, which at 9d per day suggests 55 to 80 man-days in clearing.
c2 (Man-days planting per acre): Anschel (1965, p. 143) reports 36.4 man-days per acre “for
establishment” of Para. This seems low if it does not include clearing, so I take it as a measure of
planting time.
T (Trees per tapper): Usuanlele (nd, p. 258); during the Second World War a tapper could
produce 2 pounds of rubber daily. Weinstein (1983, p. 17); Amazon tappers tapped 100 to 200 trees
daily. For Para, Anschel (1965, p. 240) reports an average of 271 trees per tapper. Blanckenburg
(1965) states that a tapper producing lumps from Para can tap 600 trees per day, but only 450
when tapping for sheets.
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D1 (Man-days per tapper): For Para, Anschel (1965, p. 145) reports that one tapper will tap 2
acres a day 150 days per year. BP5/1915 stated expenses to the “native communities” of £258 for
wood, carriers and plantation labor for 37,375 trees.
D2 (Man-days annual upkeep): Anschel (1965, p. 143) reports 10.5 man-days of weeding per
acre per year for Para. Blanckenburg (1965) states that an FAO team estimates 60 man-days of
labor are needed per acre of Para; it is not explicitly stated whether this includes tapping as well.
If it does, it seems low. He also noted that food crop farms were much better weeded than rubber
plantations.
D3 (Man-days processing per lb): SNAR 1911; experiments in the Mamu reserve cost 8.25 d
per lb of dry rubber, for both tapping and preparation. SNAR 1912; similar experiments cost
3.98 d per lb “apart from cost of supervision, harvesting, and preparation.” Blanckenburg (1965)
estimated 2d per lb as processing costs during the 1960s (which exactly offsets the increase in
price). BP5/1915 stated expenses to the government and forest department of roughly £435 for
staff, carriers, “rubber shed boys,” tapping implements, and shed depreciation for 37,375 trees.
E (Equipment multiplier): For Para, Anschel (1965, p. 243) reports that a mature plantation
bringing in £277 in gross revenue will face costs of “tapping, collecting and processing” equal to
£36.3 along with depreciation equal to £37.9 if rubber is inter-planted and £61.3 if it is planted
alone. The costs of “tapping, collecting, and processing” are exclusive of the 12 share paid to
tappers, so this suggests the cost of depreciation was 102% to 168% the cost of “collecting and
processing.” He reports an average wage per day of 4.75s (p.81), suggesting 158 man-days per acre.
Since he also assumes (p.104) 404 lbs per acre of rubber, this suggests 0.38 man-days are needed for
processing one lb of Para. During the 1960s, it was not economical for farmers to invest in rollers
and smokehouses, and so many worked through cooperative societies.
p (Producer price in d per lb): SNAR 1908; 1s 6d per lb (18d per lb) for Benin lump, when
comparable Para was selling for 41.5d per lb. Other Benin City samples were valued from 32d to
44d per lb when comparable Para selling for 54d per lb and Benin lump was selling for 24d per lb.
SNAR 1910; 6s 6d per lb (78d per lb), for rubber much better than what was normally exported.
SNAR 1911; 3s 8.75d per lb (44.75d per lb) when the price of the best Para was 4s 6d (54d). The
report also suggests a price of 1s 6d per lb (18d per lb). Anschel (1965) reports export prices that
average £153 per ton from 1900 to 1921, or 16.39d per lb. SNAR 1912, 3s 4d per lb (40d per
lb) of which 2/3 went to the producers and 1/3 to the government. Dumett (1971, p. 89) states
that during the Gold Coast rubber boom, rubber sold for £4-5, of which producers received £2
per 60 lbs, or 8d per lb. Blanckenburg (1965) reports that in April 1962 farmers received 1s per
lb of dry un-smoked rubber (generally grade B2), and 1s 2d for rubber processed and smoked in
the cooperative station. Bata paid 13.75d per lb of B2 to its suppliers at that time; it paid 17d for
RSS1, when the London price was 23.75d; this suggests farmers received 1213.75 × 1723.75 ≈ 62% of the
London price. He thus estimates that 300 lbs per acre yields £15, half of which goes to the tapper.
BP5/1915 states that, netting out freight and other charges, rubber was sold for 16d per lb, and
that Miller offered 21d per lb in Benin City. (Egboh, 1985, p. 167) gives a price of 12d to 15d per
lb of Benin lump in 1907. He (p. 176) states that the “purchase price” of rubber rose from 12d
per lb in 1909 to 42d in 1910. CSO 26 09125 Assessment Report on Benin Division; most rubber
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from plantations around Benin City during the late 1920s was bought by James Thomas of Sapele
for 1s per lb. BP 209 1914 - Forestry Report 1913; 1s per lb for “Benin lump” in 1913.
w (Wage in pence per man-day): SNAR 1899/1900; 9d to 1s (12d) per day. SNAR 1907; the
cost of a “native labourer” never exceeds 3d a day, while unskilled labor varies from 6d to 1s per
day. Frankema (2010) uses colonial Blue Books to show that praedial wages in Lagos and the
surrounding rural areas ranged from 6d to 15d in the period 1900 to 1915; he has confirmed these
figures with me in personal communication. CSO 26 09125 Assessment Report on Benin Division;
in 1927 casual labor was paid £1 per month, and laborers made extra money in their spare time.
This same report estimated the income of a man and wife at roughly £23.5. Ben Prof 8/1/2 Civil
Judgment Book 1909-1911; a 1911 contract from Bey and Zimmer stipulated 15s per month plus
4s subsistence per week for laborers.
